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"Experimenting" with State Constitutional
Limits on Punitive Damages in
California: Application of the
California Excessive Fines Clause
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as
a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an
appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since
then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained on
appeal. The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental ef-
fect on the research and development of new products. Some man-
ufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it
is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or
vaccine into the market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and mo-
tor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of
lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages.'
"Large assessments of punitive damages may ... be a major
threat to the continued viability of most manufacturing concerns
,,2
I. Introduction
A recent study by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice'
found that, since 1960, the number of cases in which punitive damages
have been awarded has increased dramatically.4 For example, according
to the study, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s the number of
punitive damage awards in Chicago almost doubled.5 In San Francisco,
during the same period, "punitive damages were awarded in more than
1. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
2. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 6 (1982).
3. M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FIND-
INGS (1987) [hereinafter EMPIRICAL FINDINGS]. The Rand study is based mainly on data
from jury trials in San Francisco, California, and Cook County, Illinois ("Chicago"); however,
the study also examines punitive damage awards from throughout California for the years
1980-1984. DeBenedictis, Punitive Awards Found Increasing In Business Cases, L.A. Daily J.,
Mar. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter Punitive Awards].
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at iii; see also K. REDDEN & L. SCHLUETER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, § I.I(A) (Supp. 1987) ("In recent years, we have seen an ever-growing
number of cases in which the plaintiff sought punitive damages.").
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at 9.
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one out of every eight jury trials (13.6 percent)... in which a defendant
was found liable for compensatory damages.",6 In business tort and
breach of contract cases, the study found that the number of punitive
awards between the late 1970s and the early 1980s doubled in Chicago
and tripled in San Francisco. 7
In addition to increases in the number of punitive damage awards,
the Rand study also found that, since 1960, there has been a startling
increase in the average amount of punitive awards.' The study found
that, in Chicago, the average punitive damage award increased from
$164,000 in the late 1970s to $729,000 in the early 1980s.f In San Fran-
cisco, the average punitive award increased from $170,000 to $381,000
during the same period."0 Moreover, in the 1980s punitive damage
awards of one million dollars or more became increasingly common-
place.11 For example, in 1987 Texaco won three billion dollars in puni-
tive damages in its suit against Pennzoil for tortious breach of contract. 12
In 1988 two Ashland Oil officials were awarded seventy million dollars in
punitive damages in a wrongful discharge employment case.13 Even
more recently, in 1989 the Honda Motor Company was assessed five mil-
lion dollars in punitive damages in a products liability case involving one
of its all terrain vehicles or ATVs. 14
These cases represent only a small sample of the many million dollar
jury verdicts issued each year.1" Among these verdicts, the increasing
number of astronomical punitive damage awards has generated growing
concern among many groups that continued increases in the number and
size of punitive damage awards may seriously threaten the future stabil-
6. Id.
7. Id. at vi.
8. Id. at iii; Punitive Awards, supra note 3, at 1, col. 6.
9. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at 15.
10. Id.
11. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139,
145 (1986); Owen, supra note 2, at 6; Greenhouse, Supreme Court Agrees to Weigh Putting
Limits on Damage Awards, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 1 and at All, col. 3 (report-
ing that according to a brief submitted by the National Association of Manufacturers in
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., discussed infra notes 68-69 and 97-140, "while
punitive damage awards of more than $250,000 were rare only a few years ago, 'today hardly a
month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict against a
manufacturer.' ").
12. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The award
was ultimately reduced to one billion dollars. See infra note 334.
13. See Epperson, Jury Awards 2 Ashland Oil Ex-Officials $70 Million in Suit Over Their
Dismissal, Wall St. J., June 14, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
14. See Victor, Settle In Secret?, NAT'L J., Nov. 25, 1989, at 2909.
15. See Marcotte, Biggest Personal Injury Awards; Top 10 California Judgments Listed By
Jury Verdict Research, A.B.A. J. (Cal. ed.), Oct. 1, 1988, at CE-15-16; Sella, The Ten Largest
Jury Verdicts of 1988, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 45-51.
[Vol. 17:439
EXCESSIVE FINES
ity of American industry. 6 To date, most of the "concern" over this
trend has been voiced by businesses,17 insurance companies, 8 and schol-
ars.19 The public, however, is increasingly being warned that the cost of
damage awards paid by businesses, as well as the cost of liability insur-
ance obtained by businesses to cover such awards, is ultimately passed
along to consumers.20 In response to these concerns, there has been in-
creased pressure placed on courts and legislatures to take steps to control
punitive damages.
This Note argues that the excessive fines clause of the California
Constitution should be applied by California courts to limit awards of
punitive damages in civil cases. The remainder of Part I reviews various
legislative measures and recent judicial efforts aimed at controlling puni-
tive damages. Part II criticizes the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Ingraham v. Wright,21 which limits application of the Eighth
Amendment to criminal cases, and Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,22 which holds that the Eighth Amendment does not apply
to punitive damage awards in cases between private parties. Part III dis-
cusses the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine, which al-
lows states to interpret state constitutional provisions differently from
their federal counterparts, and points out that California has been a
leader in developing this doctrine. Part IV summarizes the historical
evolution of the California excessive fines clause and concludes that its
application was not intended to be limited to criminal cases. This Part
also discloses that excessive fines clauses in other state constitutions have
been applied to punitive damages. Part V outlines a proposed constitu-
tional limit on punitive damages based on the treble damages model.
The Note concludes that California should adopt this model.
A. Legislative Measures
In response to calls for greater control of punitive damages, several
state legislatures have attempted to restrict the availability of punitive
16. Owen, supra note 2, at 6; Greenhouse, supra note 11, at All, col. 3 (reporting that
according to the National Association of Manufacturers, multi-million dollar punitive damage
awards are having a "devastating" effect on industry); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
17. See Punishment Through the Pocketbook, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 19, 1988,
at 13.
18. See K. REDDEN & L. SCHLUETER, supra note 4, at 1 (noting the "uproar of the
insurance industry over the insurability of punitive damages").
19. See, eg., Owen, supra note 2, at 6.
20. See, eg., Feder, The Coming Showdown in Car Insurance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988,
at Fl, col. 2 (during debate over various automobile insurance reform initiatives on November
1988 California ballot, the insurance industry stressed that higher auto insurance rates resulted
from the increasing number of large jury awards).
21. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
22. 109 S. Ct, 2909 (1989).
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damages.23 For example, Nebraska24 and Washington25 prohibit recov-
ery of punitive damages. 26  Louisiana,27 Massachusetts, 28  and New
Hampshire29 prohibit punitive damages except when such awards are ex-
pressly authorized by statute to remedy a particular wrong.3" Indiana
prohibits punitive damage awards against defendants in civil cases if the
defendants are also subject to criminal liability for the same conduct.31
Illinois recently outlawed punitive damages in legal and medical mal-
practice actions.32 Finally, Georgia,33 Connecticut, and Michigan treat
23. See generally Shalowitz, Tort Reform; Outlook 'Encouraging' in 8 States: ATRA, Bus.
INSURANCE, Feb. 6, 1989, at 3.
24. The Nebraska rule has been interpreted categorically:
It has been a fundamental rule of law in this state that punitive, vindictive, or exem-
plary damages will not be allowed, and that the measure of recovery in all civil cases
is compensation for the injury sustained. This rule is so well settled that we dispose
of it merely by the citation of cases so holding.
1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4.11 (Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter LAW AND PRACTICE] (quoting Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684,
688 (1960) (citations omitted)). Nebraska has to date refused to recognize any exceptions to
this general rule. Id.; see also NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1988).
25. Washington recently has recognized several exceptions to its general rule prohibiting
punitive damage awards. In particular, at least one Washington appeals court has allowed
treble damages for willful timber trespass. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 4.12 (citing
Henriksen v. Lyons, 33 Wash. App. 123, 652 P.2d 18 (1982)). The rationale given for abrogat-
ing the general prohibition against punitive damages was to provide "deterrence, compensation
and punishment," the traditional justifications for punitive awards. Id.
26. Id. §§ 4.11-4.12.
27. An example of a Louisiana statute that authorizes punitive damages is § 3.4278.1
which allows treble damages for willfully and intentionally destroying or removing trees from
another's land without permission. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.4278.1 (West 1987); see also
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 4.09.
28. To reinforce its general policy against punitive damages, Massachusetts has specifi-
cally outlawed punitive awards in three types of cases: actions for libel or slander, actions
against public employers, and actions against a decedent's executor or administrator. LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 4.10 n.6. However, in breach of warranty actions Massachu-
setts courts recently have held that manufacturers face awards of up to three times, but not less
than two times, the actual damages plus attorneys fees. Id. § 4.10 (citing Hannon v. Original
Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (1982) and Burnham v. Mark IV
Homes, Inc., 387 Mass. 575, 441 N.E.2d 1027 (1982)).
29. Id. § 4.11.5; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986) (effective July 1, 1986).
30. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, §§ 4.09-4.10, 4.11.5.
31. Id. § 4.08. Indiana courts have held that even if a defendant faces criminal prosecu-
tion, punitive damages may be awarded: "(1) when the conduct of the defendant indicated a
heedless disregard of the consequences; (2) when the statute of limitations on the criminal
charge had run; or, (3) when, in an action against a corporation, the corporation could not be
criminally prosecuted for the act of its agent." Id. (citing Nicholson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc.
v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975)).
32. Id. § 4.07; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115 (1985) (effective Jan. 1,
1986); cf infra note 54 and accompanying text.
33. In 1987 Georgia enacted a statute that bars punitive damage awards in tort cases in
which "the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff .... LAW AND
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punitive damages almost exclusively as compensatory in nature.34
Alternatively, some states have enacted statutes restricting the
amount of punitive damage awards. Colorado35 and Oklahoma36 limit
punitive damages to the amount of compensatory damages awarded.
However, under certain circumstances, both Colorado 37 and Oklahoma
38
allow punitive awards to exceed the amount of actual damages. Florida
limits the amount of punitive damages to three times the compensatory
damages awarded.39 Similarly, Connecticut restricts punitive damages in
product liability suits to twice the actual damages."
In 1985 Montana tried a different approach by passing legislation
that limited punitive damages in certain tort cases to $25,000 or one per-
cent of the defendant's net worth, whichever was greater.41 Two years
after its adoption, this provision was quietly deleted from the Montana
PRACICE, supra note 24, § 4.07.5; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6 (1987) (effective July 1,
1987).
34. LAW AND PRACrICE, supra note 24, § 4.02; see also infra note 135.
35. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1987).
36. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9(A) (West 1987) (as amended in 1986).
37, Title 13, § 21-102(3) of the Colorado Code provides that the amount of exemplary
damages can be increased to three times the amount of actual damages, if it is shown that
"[t]he defendant has continued the behavior or repeated the action .... in a willful and
wanton manner" or "has acted in a willful and wanton manner during the pendency of the
action in a manner which has further aggravated the damages of the plaintiff when the defend-
ant knew or should have known such action would produce aggravation." COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(3) (1987).
38. Section 9(A) of the Oklahoma Damages Code provides that juries have discretion to
award any amount of punitive damages if "there is clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant is guilty of conduct evincing a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of another,
oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed. . . ." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9(A)
(West 1987) (emphasis added). The language in this section is similar to § 3294 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code, discussed infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
39. Section 768.73(l)(a) of the Florida Code provides that in all civil cases, except class
actions, "based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial
transactions, professional liability, or breach of warranty that involves willful, wanton, or gross
misconduct, the judgment for the total amount of punitive damages awarded to a claimant
shall not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded. . . ." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that any
punitive award greater than three times the actual damages "is presumed to be excessive." Id.
at § 768.73(1)(b). The defendant can rebut this presumption if he is able to show by clear and
convincing evidence that under the circumstances the award is not excessive. Id.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1988).
41. Adams, Montana Puts Cap On Punitive Damage Awards; New Law One of Broadest In
U.S., Nat'l L. J., Apr. 22, 1985, at 7, col. 1 [hereinafter Montana Cap]. As amended in 1985,
§ 27-1-221 of the Montana Code provided:
(6)(a) In cases of actual fraud or actual malice, the jury may award reasonable puni-
tive damages after considering the circumstances of the case.
(6)(b) In all other cases where punitive damages are awarded, punitive damages may
be in an amount up to but no greater than $25,000 or 1% of the defendant's net
worth, whichever is greater.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(a)-(b) (1985).
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Code.42 Despite this reversal, other states have continued to adopt con-
troversial reform measures. For example, in 1987 Virginia placed a
$350,000 cap on all punitive damage awards.43 The same year, Alabama
enacted a $250,000 limit on punitive damages, subject to certain specified
exceptions,' and Texas adopted a limit of "four times the amount of
actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater. '45 The Texas provi-
sion also is subject to certain prescribed exceptions.46
In 1987 the California Legislature adopted more stringent standards
for imposing punitive damages.47 The Civil Liability Reform Act of
1987 (California Act) provides, in part, for revision of Civil Code section
3294, the general statute authorizing punitive damages in California.48
As amended, section 3294 restricts awards of punitive damages to cases
in which the plaintiff proves by "clear and convincing evidence," rather
than by a mere preponderance, that the defendant is "guilty of oppres-
sion, fraud, or malice."4 9 In addition, the definition of oppression was
made more restrictive by requiring a finding of "despicable conduct" by
the defendant.50 The new definition of malice also requires "willful" and
"conscious disregard" of the rights and safety of others rather than just
42. As amended in 1987, section 27-1-221(1) simply provides that "reasonable punitive
damages may be awarded where the defendant has been guilty of actual fraud or malice."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (1987). Although there has been no official explanation of
the motivation for this change, it is likely that following the adoption of the reform provision
in 1985, groups opposed to tort reform placed substantial political pressure on members of the
state legislature to repeal the unique provision capping punitive damages. Cf Haggerty, Cali-
fornia Agent Leads One-Man Tort Campaign, Nat'l Underwriter-Prop. & C. (employee benefits
ed.), Feb. 13, 1989, at 3.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1989).
44. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1989). The $250,000 limit does not apply when the
defendant engaged in either a pattern and practice of intentional wrongful conduct or conduct
involving actual malice. Id. § 6-11-21(l)-(2). Libel, slander, and defamation cases also are
excepted from the limitation. Id. § 6-11-21(3).
45. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
46. Id. § 41.008 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (punitive damages cap does not apply to cases in-
volving intentional torts or malice).
47. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1989) (as amended by Willie L. Brown, Jr.-Bill
Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987); see also Review of Selected 1987 California Legis-
lation, 19 PAC. L.J. 427, 689-91 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 Legislation]; Dresslar, Time May Tell
Effects of New Liability Law, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 2, 1987, at 2, col. 1 [hereinafter Time May
Tell]; Dresslar, Years of Lawsuits Predicted Over Tort Compromise; Trial Lawyers Say Reform
Law Needs Court Clarification; Punitives Redefined?, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6
[hereinafter Years of Lawsuits].
48. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1498, sec. 1.
49. As revised, § 3294(a) provides that punitive damages are permitted:
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of op-
pression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may re-
cover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a).
50. Section 3294(c) as revised provides the following definitions of malice and oppression:
conscious disregard. 1
The California Act further mandates that trials in all cases seeking
punitive damages be bifurcated and prohibits plaintiffs from introducing
any evidence of the defendant's wealth until after the defendant is found
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.52 Plaintiffs also may no longer
specify the amount of punitive damages sought. 3 Lastly, the California
Act prohibits claims for punitive damages against doctors unless such
claims are first approved by the court.5 4
Although the California legislation appears to be a positive step in
restricting the availability of punitive damages, its terms are vague and it
does not provide juries with any additional guidance in setting the
amount of punitive damage awards. 5 Further, the changes in the Cali-
fornia punitive damages statute are not significant in redefining when pu-
nitive damages will be awarded by juries. 6
B. Judicial Action
L State Efforts
As the controversy over punitive damages has heated up, courts in
some states have taken steps to limit both the size and availability of
punitive awards. In California, no reported cases have yet addressed the
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful
and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and un-
just hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c).
51. Id.
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d); see also, 1987 Legislation, supra note 47, at 689-9 1; Time
May Tell and Years of Lawsuits, supra note 47.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(e).
54. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13. Coincidentally, the California Act was a compro-
mise forged by a small group of trial lawyers, insurers, doctors, and business people. Years of
Lawsuits, supra note 47. In exchange for their support of provisions in the Act that make it
more difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive damages, trial lawyers got a provision allowing
them to collect higher contingency fees in medical injury cases, currently capped under
MICRA, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975. Id. Trial lawyers also got a
commitment from the coalition of insurers, doctors, and business people that they would not
pursue a 1988 ballot initiative aimed at either capping contingency fees in personal injury cases
or requiring additional restrictions in the general statute governing punitive damages. Id.
55. Many California trial lawyers believe that it will take years for courts to develop a
workable definition of "clear and convincing evidence" as used in the context of punitive dam-
ages. Id.
56. According to Thomas Stoltman, first vice president of the Los Angeles Trial Lawyers
Association and member of the Board of the California Trial Lawyers Association, the changes
in Civil Code § 3294 do not alter the status quo. Id. "To win punitive damages cases,
[Stoltman] said, 'you [have always needed] ... proof beyond a mere preponderance of evidence
because of the nature of [punitive damages]. Jurors, in. their own minds, require more strin-
gent proof from the plaintiff before awarding punitive damages.'" Id.
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application of any provisions of the state constitution to punitive damage
awards.17 In 1988, however, the California Supreme Court handed down
two landmark rulings that were specifically aimed at restricting the avail-
ability of punitive damages in some cases.
In Moradi-Shalai v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. ," the court over-
ruled its earlier decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court,59 thereby abolishing all suits by third parties for bad faith han-
dling of insurance claims.. Four months later, in Foley i, Interactive Data
Corp.,60 the court held that tort damages are not available for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied to employ-
ment contracts. The decisions in both of these cases were motivated, at
least in part, by the court's concern over excessive damages.61
It is no coincidence that the Rand study, discussed earlier,62 found
that the overall rise in punitive damage awards over the past twenty-five
years was due, in large part, to the increase in business tort and breach of
contract cases of the type addressed in Moradi-Shalai and Foley.63 Nev-
ertheless, according to the Rand study, only about one-third of the busi-
ness tort and breach of contract cases that awarded punitive damages in
the early 1980s involved bad faith claims.' 4 Consequently, the study con-
cluded that, even when bad faith claims are excluded, the number of
57. The lack of cases discussing the applicability, if any, of various provisions of the Cali-
fornia Constitution is not surprising. The prevailing view among lawyers in California, as
elsewhere in the United States, remains that the Federal Constitution is the "constitution of
first resort." Turner, The Constitution of First Resort, CAL. LAW., June 1989, at 51-54. Yet,
as the Supreme Court continues to close off avenues of relief under the Federal Constitution
and send issues back to state courts for adjudication under state law, see, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050 (1989), the sequence of constitutional argu-
ments will undoubtedly begin to shift. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection
ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491, 495 (1977) (noting that "[o]f late, . . . more
and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions in the
[federal] Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than fed-
eral provisions, even those identically phrased."); Linde, Without 'Due Process' Unconstitu-
tional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 133 (1970); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering
the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. RaV. 379, 391 (1980) [hereinafter First Things First].
58. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
59. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
60. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
61. See Moradi-Shalai, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (noting
that one of the "undesirable social ... effects" of the Royal Globe rule was "excessive jury
awards"); Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (claiming that one of
the major reasons for the court's ruling was that the "expansion of tort remedies in the em-
ployment context ha[d] potentially enormous consequences for the stability of the business
community.").
62. See EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
63. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at vi, 65; Punitive Awards, supra note 3, at 1, col.
6.
64. Punitive Awards, supra note 3, at 1, col. 6; EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at vi-
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business tort and breach of contract cases awarding punitive damages has
increased substantially.65 Thus, despite the recent efforts of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the need for additional control of punitive damages
in California persists.
2. National Efforts
On the national level, several novel arguments, based on provisions
in the Federal Constitution, recently have been advanced in the courts in
an attempt to place constitutional limits on punitive damages. In partic-
ular, punitive damages have been challenged under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 6 On several occasions from 1986 to
1988 the Supreme Court declined to decide this issue. 7 Finally, in June
1989 the Court, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,68
ruled that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause "does not
apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties. '69
Punitive damages also have been challenged recently under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment7" and the constitutional
vagueness doctrine. 71 To date, the Supreme Court has adhered to the
cautious approach it followed in reviewing the initial series of eighth
amendment cases72 and has elected not to decide either of these related
65. Punitive Awards, supra note 3, at 1, col. 6; EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 3, at vi-
vii.
66. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67. See Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1647 (1988); Dow-
ney Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Nielsen, cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2023 (1988); Playtex Holdings, Inc. v. O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). In Aetna, 475
U.S. at 828-29, the Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment argument "raise[d] impor-
tant issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved." Similarly, two years later, in
Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651, the Court noted that the applicability of the Eighth Amend-
ment to punitive damages was "a question of some moment and difficulty."
68.. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989) (7-2 decision). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Scalia, and
Kennedy joined. Id at 2912. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Marshall joined. Id. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part in which Justice Stevens joined. Id.
69. Id. at 2912, 2920-21. The rationale of the Court's decision in Browning-Ferris is dis-
cussed infra notes 97-140 and accompanying text.
70. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 292 1; Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1649-50. The pros
and cons of the due process argument are discussed in greater detail infra notes 304-309 and
accompanying text.
71. See Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986); see also Note,
Can Punitive Damages Standards Be Void for Vagueness?, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 52 (1988).
72. See Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1650 (eighth amendment challenge not properly raised
below); Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828-29 (unnecessary to reach eighth amendment issue).
Winter 1990]
448 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 17:439
issues.73 Yet, dictum in Browning-Ferris and Bankers Life suggests that
at least five members of the Court may be willing to rule that "the Due
Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil
cases brought by private parties."74 Similarly, in Browning-Ferris Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, indicated that in her view the
vagueness argument may be meritorious." Despite these words of en-
couragement, the Court has yet to uphold either a due process or vague-
ness challenge to a punitive damage award.76
II. Eighth Amendment Precedent
A. Ingraham v. Wright
Until recently, the most definitive decision of the United States
Supreme Court interpretting the scope of the Eighth Amendment was
Ingraham v. Wright.7 7 Ingraham involved a claim that corporal punish-
ment inflicted in Florida public schools constituted "cruel and unusual
punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 78 By a slim
five-to-four majority, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment applied
only to criminal cases.79 In so holding, the Court stated that "[b]ail,
fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the crimi-
nal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitatons the text of
the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those en-
trusted with the criminal-law function of government.""0 The majority
also stated that "[a]n examination of the history of the [Eighth] Amend-
ment and the decisions of [the Supreme] Court construing the proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was [only]
73. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921 (due process challenge not sufficiently raised in
lower courts); Bankirs Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1649-50 (due process challenge not adequately pre-
served on appeal); Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828-29 (unnecessary to reach due process claim).
74. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring);
see also id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Bankers
Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1654-56 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
75. 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
76. In the months following its decision in Browning-Ferris, the Court denied certiorari in
three cases that presented due process and/or vagueness challenges to punitive damage
awards. See Clardy v. Sanders, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989); Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ains-
worth, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989); Vintage Enter., Inc. v. Jaye, 110 S. Ct. 377 (1989). Recently,
however, the Court granted certiorari in another case that raises the due process issue. See
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 1990 Westlaw 15078 (1990). Oral argument in the
Pacific Mututal case is expected to be scheduled for some time during the fall of 1990. Green-
house, Justices to Decide Damage Awards Issue, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at A17, col. 1.
77. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision).
78. Id. at 653.
79. Id. at 664.
80. Id.
designed to protect those convicted of crimes. 8
1
In the late 1980s a growing number of law review commentaries and
court opinions began to sharply criticize the Ingraham decision.8 2 Some
scholars challenged the historical underpinnings of the majority's conclu-
sion. 3 Others argued that since Ingraham only involved the application
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
its holding with respect to the Excessive Fines Clause was merely dicta.8"
Despite this criticism, state courts repeatedly relied on Ingraham to find
that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to
civil cases.85 In 1988 the Georgia Supreme Court broke this pattern by
attacking the majority's analysis in Ingraham and adopting the reasoning
of the dissenting opinion. 86
The central theme of Justice White's dissent in Ingraham is that
there is no "recognized distinction" betwebn criminal and noncriminal
81. Id. One writer on this topic has argued that "the civil defendant needs even greater
protection against excessive fines than does the criminal defendant, precisely because there are
fewer constitutional protections available in civil actions." Note, Punitive Damages and the
Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework For Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 1433, 1441-42 (1987) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Analytical Framework].
82. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 11; Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. Rtv. 1233 (1987); Note, The Constitution-
ality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85
MICH. L. Rav. 1699 (1987) [hereinafter Constitutionality]; Analytical Framework, supra note
81; Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 (1988).
83. Jeffries, supra note 11; Massey, supra note 82; see also Colonial Pipeline, 365 S.E.2d at
830-31. It should be noted that the text of the Eighth Amendment does not contain any ex-
press limitation on its application. See Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1441; Colonial
Pipeline, 365 S.E.2d at 830 n.3. The Georgia Supreme Court emphasized this omission in
Colonial Pipeline by pointing out that
[i]n light of the fact that the Eighth Amendment was placed between the Seventh
Amendment which provides for trial by jury in civil cases and the Ninth Amendment
which is a reservation of rights of the people, the absence of any language limiting the
Eighth Amendment to criminal cases is especially noticeable.
Id.
84. Massey, supra note 82, at 1240; Colonial Pipeline, 365 S.E.2d at 829. Professor Mas-
sey points out that all of the "prior decisions" referred to by the majority in Ingraham "in-
volved consideration of a plainly criminal punishment." Massey, supra note 82, at 1237.
Thus, Massey criticizes that
to reach definitive conclusions about the scope of the excessive fines clause while
[only] considering and deciding cases challenging a given punishment as cruel and
unusual is to ignore the separate text of the excessive fines clause and to fail to con-
sider the differing context in which an excessive fines claim may arise.
Id. at 1239 (footnotes omitted).
85. See, eg., Downey Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d
1072, 1100-1, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 851 (1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984); Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746
S.W.2d 810, 817 (Tex. 1988); see also State ex reL Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., I Ohio St.
3d 151, 158 n.5, 438 N.E.2d 120, 125 n.5 (1982).
86. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, 829-31, appeal dis-
missed, 109 S. Ct. 36 (1988).
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punishment for purposes of applying the Eighth Amendment.87 Further,
he claimed that use of the criminal/noncriminal distinction as the basis
for interpreting the application of a given statute was "plainly wrong."88
In his view "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a
punishment is inflicted has been labeled as criminal, but whether thepur-
pose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily associated with [crimi-
nal] punishment .... 89
1. Punitive Damages as Fines
In discussing the "purposive approach" that he advocates, Justice
White's dissent in Ingraham identifies retribution, rehabilitation, and de-
terrence as the traditional purposes of criminal punishment." These are
the same justifications commonly associated with punitive damages.91 In
fact, in nearly every jurisdiction including California the stated purpose
for awarding punitive damages is "to punish the defendant for his im-
proper motive, and to deter like conduct in others."92
At least one member of the Supreme Court has recently recognized
that "[t]he character of a sanction imposed as punishment 'is not
changed by the mode in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or
criminal prosecution.' "9 Thus, from a functional as well as a theoreti-
cal standpoint, criminal punishments and punitive damages are indistin-
guishable.94 In addition, punitive damages easily fit within the guidelines
87. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686 (White, J., dissenting); see also Colonial Pipe-
line, 365 S.E.2d at 830 (citing Justice White's dissent in Ingraham with approval).
88. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 686 (White, J., dissenting) (" '[E]ven a clear legislative classifi-
cation of a statute as "non-penal" would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal
statute.'" (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
89. Id. at 686-87 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. The majority opinion in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., conceded this
point. 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 (1989) ("[W]e agree ... that punitive damages advance the
interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also among the interests advanced by the
criminal law . . . ."). Justice O'Connor reached the same conclusion in her concurring and
dissenting opinion. Id. at 2926 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) ("this Court's cases
leave no doubt that punitive damages serve the same purposes-punishment and deterrence--
as the criminal law....").
92. K. REDDEN & L. SCHLUETER, supra note 4, § 5.2(a)(5), at 191; Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928 n.13, 582 P.2d 980, 990 n.13, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 n.13
(1978) ("The purpose of punitive damages is to punish wrongdoers and thereby deter the com-
mission of wrongful acts."); see also Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d
827, 830-31 (1988).
93. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
94. See Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1446-47, 1470 (1987). The similarity
between punitive damages and other forms of criminal punishment has led some commenta-
tors to suggest that the appropriate standard of proof for imposing punitive damages should be
"beyond a reasonable doubt." See, e.g., Jeffries & Freeman, Constitutional Issues in Punitive
Damages Litigation: an Agenda for Defense Counsel, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jan. 1989, at 9, 10
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established by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez" for
determining whether a sanction is penal in nature.9 6
B. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
During the final days of its October 1988 term, the Supreme Court
issued a decision in the closely watched case9 7 of Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc..98 In Browning-Ferris the Court granted certi-
orari for the sole purpose of deciding whether the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment placed any limits on awards of punitive dam-
ages in civil cases.99 The jury in the underlying trial had found that the
defendant, Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI), violated the Sherman Anti-
trust Act by attempting to monopolize the Burlington, Vermont waste
[hereinafter Defense Agenda]; Freeman, Damage Control Defense lawyers say punitive dam-
ages violate due process, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1990, at 33.
95. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The seven criteria set out in Kennedy are as follows:
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribu-
tion and deterrence;
(5) Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
(6) Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is as-
signable for it; and,
(7) Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 168-69.
96. For an excellent discussion of the application of the Kennedy factors to punitive dam-
ages, see Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1443-44, 1446-47; Constitutionality, supra
note 82, at 1720-26, 1723 (1987) (concluding based on an analysis of the Kennedy factors that
"[p]unitive damages are what they are labeled-punitive"); see also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct.
at 2932 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) ("I agree with those commentators who
have found it easy to conclude that punitive damges are penal under the Mendoza-Martinez
factors."). The California Supreme Court routinely has used the seven Kennedy criteria in
determining whether a sanction is penal. See, e.g., In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 919-22, 663
P.2d 216, 218-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-62 (1983) (concluding, based on an analysis of the
Kennedy factors, that mandatory registration of sex offenders convicted under a misdemeanor
disorderly conduct statute was "punishment").
97. See Punishment Through The Pocketbook, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 19,
1988, at 13; Grady, Business Watches 'Case of Decade' Chicago Tribune, Apr. 18, 1989, at 3;
Justices Hear Arguments In 'Bloated Damages' Case, S.F. Banner Daily J., Apr. 20, 1989, at 6,
col. 5; Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument on Legality of Punitive Damage Award, BNA
DER No. 74, Apr. 20, 1989; Is The Constitution Punitive?, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1989, § 1, at
14, col. 1.
98. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). After issuing its opinion in Browning-Ferris, the Court denied
certiorari in three other cases challenging punitive damage awards. See Hodder v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989); April
Enterprises v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1983), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3242 (1989); Miller v. Cudahy Co., 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989). These cases had been held by the
Court pending a decision in Browning-Ferris. Greenhouse, supra note 11, at Al, col. 1 and at
All, col. 3.
99. 109 S. Ct. 527 (1988) ("Petition for writ of certiorari ... [is] granted limited to Ques-
tion 2 presented by the petition."); see also Greenhouse, supra note 11, at 1, col. 1.
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disposal market." ° The jury also found that, under Vermont tort law,
BFI's conduct constituted interference with contractual relations.10 1
As punishment for BFI's acts, the jury awarded the plaintiff, Kelco
Disposal, Inc., six million dollars in punitive damages.10 2 The award
represented approximately six percent of BFI's net worth10 3 and was
over 115 times the award of compensatory damages.' ° Upon review, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Vermont law, upheld the pu-
nitive award. 105 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit expressly
denied BFI's claim that the award violated the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. 106
In affirming the Second Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court shifted
the focus of its eighth amendment analysis away from the criminal/civil
distinction relied on by the majority in Ingraham."°7 Instead, the Brown-
ing-Ferris Court based its decision on what it perceived was the history
and purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause."8 On the historical side, the
Court concluded that "at the time of the drafting and ratification of the
[Eighth] Amendment, the word 'fine' was understood to mean a payment
to a sovereign as punishment for some offense."' 1 9 Furthermore, accord-
ing to the majority's analysis, "nothing in English history suggests that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the 1689 Bill of Rights, the direct ancestor
of our Eighth Amendment, was intended to apply to damages awarded in
100. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1988).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 407.
103. Id. at 410. The punitive damage award amounted to .5% of defendant Browning-
Ferris Industries' revenues and less than 5% of its net income for fiscal year 1986. Id. The
court found that the amount of the award was "not inconsistent with punitive damages levied
in other jurisdictions against large corporations." Id.
104. Id. at 406-07. The jury's verdict in the separate, one-day trial on damages was to
award $51,146 for the antitrust claim, $51,146 in compensatory damages, and $6 million in
punitive damages. Id. The court subsequently amended the judgment and ordered Kelco to
choose between alternative state and federal remedies. Id. at 407. The choice was between an
award of $153,438 in treble damages and $212,500 in attorneys' fees and costs on the federal
antitrust claim or $6,066,082 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state claim. Id.
105. Id. at 410.
106. Id. ("[W]e reject the defendants' notion that the award violates the eighth amend-
ment's proscription against excessive fines. Even if the eighth amendment does apply to this
nominally civil case, we do not think the damages here were so disproportionate as to be cruel,
unusual, or constitutionally excessive.") (citations omitted).
107. The Court did observe that "our cases long have understood [the Eighth Amendment]
to apply primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishments."
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2913 (1989) (emphasis ad-
ded). Nevertheless, it concluded that "[t]o decide the instant case.... we need not go so far as
to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases." Id. at 2914.
108. Id. ("Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive Fines] Clause's reach ... it does
not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has
prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.").
109. Id. at 2915.
Winter 1990] EXCESSIVE FINES 453
disputes between private parties." '
As to the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause, the majority in
Browning-Ferris decided that the Clause "was intended to limit only
those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.""' In
addition, the Court stated that "the primary focus of the Eighth Amend-
ment was the potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial'
power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages." ' 2
The majority's analysis in Browning-Ferris is suspect for several rea-
sons. First, as Justice O'Connor's concurring and dissenting opinion
points out, the eighteenth century meaning of the word fine is not nearly
as clear as the majority's portrayal would lead one to believe. 113 For
example, one seventeenth century law dictionary described a fine as
"sometimes an amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompense upon an
offense committed against the King, and his laws, or a Lord of a
Manor.""' 4 In addition, section 37 of the Massachusetts Body of Liber-
ties, which was drafted in 1641, specifically "required that 'fines' payable
to private litigants in civil cases be proportional."'"I5 Moreover, numer-
ous recent articles that have thoroughly reviewed the history of the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause have concluded that the Clause is applicable to
punitive damages. 1
16
L State Action Analysis
The second major component of the majority opinion in Browning-
Ferris is, in essence, a state action analysis. The Court's reasoning is
summarized in the following passage:
We think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines
Clause and the nature of our constitutional framework, that the
Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps a government may
take against an individual .... The fact that punitive damages are
imposed through the aegis of courts and serve to advance govern-
mental interests is insufficient to support the step petitioners ask us
to take .... Here the government of Vermont has not taken a
positive step to punish, as it most obviously does in the criminal
context, nor has it used the civil courts to extract large payments or
forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or disabling some
110. Id. at 2916.
I1l. Id.
112. Id. at 2915; see also id. at 2920.
113. Id. at 2931.
114. Id. (quoting T. BLOuNT, LAW DICTIONARY (1670) (unpaginated version)) (emphasis
added).
115. Id. (citing 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 76
(1971) and Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of the Excessive
Fines Clause, 5 COOLY L. REV. 667, 714 (1988)) (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 2926-31 (citing and discussing recent law review articles).
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individual.1"7
At first glance the Court's reasoning may seem cogent. Upon scru-
tiny, however, the majority's analysis appears to both defy logic and dis-
ingenuously ignore well-established state action precedent. First, in most
states, including California, the recovery of punitive damages is author-
ized by statute.118 In the absence of such legislative authority, courts in
some jurisdictions flatly prohibit awards of punitive damages. 9 Thus,
on a very basic level, the participation of the state, acting through its
legislative branch, is at the heart of any private litigants' recovery of pu-
nitive damages.1 " Consequently, contrary to the majority's position in
Browning-Ferris, when the recovery of punitive damages is authorized by
statute, the government has indeed "taken a positive step to punish" cer-
tain persons, namely those defendants in civil actions who are found
liable for punitive damages under the state's statutory standards.1 22
Furthermore, by facilitating the enforcement of punitive damage
awards imposed by juries, "civil courts" are undeniably used "to extract
large payments" aimed at punishing or "disabling some individual."' 123
Where the state has "made available to ... individuals the full coercive
power of the government," the Supreme Court has ruled that state action
is present.1 24 In the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer 2 5 the Supreme
Court held that "[s]tate action.., refers to exertions of state power in all
117. Id. at 2920 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989); see also supra notes 47-56 and accom-
panying text.
119. See, e.g., supra note 24 and acccompanying text discussing the approach taken in
Nebraska.
120. But see Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988) ("Pri-
vate use of state remedies or procedures does not [alone] rise to the level of state action."); see
also infra note 124.
121. In this context, corporations would qualify as persons. As Justice O'Connor correctly
notes in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris, even though corporations
are "not entitled to 'purely personal guarantees,']" Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (1989) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
779 n.14 (1978)), since they are "protected by the Due Process Clause from overbearing and
oppressive monetary sanctions, [they are] also protected from such penalties by the Excessive
Fines Clause." Id. at 2926.
122. Consistent with this view, one commentator has concluded that "[p]unitive damages
are punitive fines imposed by the government." Olson, Problems With Punitive Damages, L.A.
Daily J., July 18, 1989, at 6, col. 3.
123. The majority opinion does not discuss whether, in its view, the term "individuals"
includes corporations for purposes of coverage under the Eighth Amendment. However, in
her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor concludes that the provision should
be applicable to corporations. Id.; see supra note 121.
124. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948); see also Tulsa Professional Collection
Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988) ("when private parties make u~e of state procedures
with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found").
125. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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formS."'1 2 6 Shelley involved a state court's enforcement of a restrictive
property covenant made between private parties.127 On these facts, the
Supreme Court ruled that "but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would
have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.' 128
Likewise, without the assistance of a court's enforcement machinery, the
recovery of punitive damages by private parties simply would not be
possible.
Despite the apparent applicability of the holding in Shelley, the ma-
jority opinion in Browning-Ferris neither discusses nor distinguishes Shel-
ley and its progeny. Instead, the Court merely concludes, without
reference to any authority, that even though punitive damages are "im-
posed through the aegis of courts," there is insufficient state action to
apply the Eighth Amendment.' 29
Although the Supreme Court repeatedly has refused to extend its
holding in Shelley,' 3° it nevertheless has endorsed the same general rule
in other cases. For example, in disposing of the contention that a state
court's application of state libel law did not constitute state action for
purposes of triggering the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court in New York Times v. Sullivan 3' made the following statement:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the [state]
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented
by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised. 132
It is axiomatic that by sanctioning and providing the means needed
to recover punitive damages, the state in effect places its imprimatur on
such awards. Thus, applying the Court's reasoning in Sullivan to awards
of punitive damages, it is equally axiomatic that "state power... has in
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id. at 18-19.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 (1989).
130. See generally.Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1086-91 (1973); Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Silard, A
Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the 'State Action 'Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee,
66 COLUM. L. REa. 855 (1966).
131. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
132. Id. at 265 (citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) and American Fed'n
of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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fact been exercised." 133 As Justice O'Connor recognized in her concur-
ring and dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris, "[a] governmental entity
can abuse its power by allowing civil juries to impose ruinous punitive
damages .... 4
Finally, even though punitive damages are paid to private individu-
als rather than directly to the state, their imposition is, as Justice
O'Connor has noted, "a way of furthering the purposes of [a state's]
criminal law."1 5 Along these lines, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,36 the
Court observed that punitive damages are "private fines levied by civil
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and deter its future occur-
rence." 137 To the extent that punitive damages serve this criminal law
function, they are, in effect, an extension of the state's police power and
as such, should constitute sufficent state action to invoke constitutional
protections.
By the same token, given the conceptual rationale for punitive dam-
ages,13 8 it would seem more appropriate for such damages to be paid to
the state instead of to private parties.1 39 In response to this criticism, as
well as to prevent successful plaintiffs from reaping windfall recoveries,
some states have begun to require the payment of at least some portion of
punitive awards to public funds." Under such a system, any remaining
133. As with Shelley, the majority opinion in Browning-Ferris neither discusses nor distin-
guishes Sullivan.
134. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
135. Id. In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1988), the
Georgia Supreme Court also noted that "[p]unitive damages, although civil in nature, nonethe-
less serve the criminal law goal of deterrence rather than the traditional compensatory goal of
civil law."
136. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
137. Id. at 350 (emphasis added); see also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932 (O'Connor,
J., concurring and dissenting) (citing prior Supreme Court cases that recognize the penal na-
ture of punitive damages).
138. See discussion of punitive damages as fines supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
139. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Massey,
supra note 82, at 1270.
140. For example, in Colorado "[o]ne third of all [punitive] damages collected ... [are]
paid into the state general fund." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987). In Florida, the
plaintiff receives 40% of the punitive damage award and "[i]f the cause of action was based on
personal injury or wrongful death, 60 percent of the award [is paid] ... to the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund . . .; otherwise, 60 percent of the award [is paid] .. .to the General
Revenue Fund." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 1988). In Illinois, judges have discre-
tion to order payment of part of a punitive damage award to a state fund. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1207 (1987). In Iowa, if the defendant's wrongful conduct was not specifically
directed at the plaintiff, 75% of the punitive damage award is paid into a civil reparations trust
fund. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(2)(b) (West 1987). In Missouri, 50% of any punitive dam-
age award, after the deduction of attorneys fees and expenses, is deemed rendered in favor of
the state and goes into the state Tort Victims' Compensation Fund. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.675(2) (Vernon 1988). Finally, in Georgia, 75% of any punitixe damage award in a
product liability case is paid into the state treasury. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002.1(e)(2) (Har-
rison Supp. 1989).
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doubt about the sufficiency of state action involved in awarding punitive
damages is effectively eliminated.
I. Independence of Rights Guaranteed by State Constitutions
It is a well settled principle of federalism that "decisions of the
[United States Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law."' 41 Instead, state supreme courts are the ultimate arbiters of state
law.142 Even when state and federal constitutional provisions are simi-
larly or identically worded, states are free to construe the state provision
differently.143 The only restraint on this independence is that states may
not infringe on any rights guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.1"
Thus, states retain the power to grant their citizens greater rights than
those protected by the Federal Constitution.'45 In addition, as long as
state courts explicitly base their rulings on "adequate and independent"
state constitutional grounds, the United States Supreme Court lacks ju-
risdiction for review.146
California has long been a leader in the development of the "ade-
quate and independent state grounds" doctrine. 4 7 For example, in 1972,
141. Brennan, supra note 57, at 502. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly reiter-
ated this principle. See, eg., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal 3d. 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280-81,
127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69 (1976).
142. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
327-28 (1975).
143. Brennan, supra note 57, at 495, 500; Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S.
487, 491-492 (1965); Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548 n.16, 531 P.2d at 1112 n.16, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 328 n.16 (listing California cases applying this rule).
144. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 552, 531 P.2d at 1111-12, 1114-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
327-28, 330-31.
145. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Brennan, supra note 57, at
491, 495. The Hawaii Supreme Court has observed that while this increase in independent
interpretation "results in a divergence of meaning between words which are the same in both
the federal and state constitutions, the system of federalism envisaged by the United States
Constitution tolerates such divergence where the result is greater protection of individual
rights under state law than under federal law." State v. Kaluna 55 Haw. 361, 369 n.6, 520
P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974) (emphasis in original).
146. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd.
Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-492 (1965); Brennan, supra note 57, at 501; see, e.g., Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 109 S. Ct. 36 (1988) (appeal of Georgia Supreme Court ruling reversing
five million dollar punitive damage award as violative of the state's excessive fines clause, dis-
missed for want ofjurisdiction). But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (if a
state court does not specify whether it relied on adequate and independent state grounds and it
"fairly appears" that the state court based its decision primarily on federal law, the Court
assumes that there are no adequate and independent state grounds).
147. Goldberg, Stanley Mosk: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 395,
401-08 (1985) ("The Supreme Court of California now leads the country in the progressive
development of state constitutional law."). For a more complete discussion of California's use
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in anticipation' 48 of a contrary ruling by the United States Supreme
Court, 49 the California Supreme Court, in People v. Anderson,'5" invali-
dated the death penalty based on the state constitution's prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment. 5 ' In contrast to the California
provision, the Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punish-
ment."' 2 Thus, in reaching its conclusion, the Anderson court stressed
differences in the language of the two provisions 53 as well as the unique
history of the California Declaration of Rights.'54
of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, see Note, Rediscovering The Califor-
nia Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 481 (1974) [hereinafter Rediscovering]; see also
First Things First, supra note 57, at 388 n.35 (listing recent California decisions relying on state
rather than federal constitutional provisions).
148. The California Supreme Court also has relied on state constitutional grounds to pre-
serve individual rights for California citizens on several other occasions when it "anticipated"
contrary rulings by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (California constitutional right of privacy
held to prohibit disclosure of personal bank records to police without the depositor's knowl-
edge or consent). As predicted, the United States Supreme Court subsequently decided that
federal law was contrary to Burrows. Brennan, supra note 57, at 501 (citing United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
149. The prediction of the California Supreme Court in this instance was incorrect since
the United States Supreme Court later concluded that without additional guidelines, imposi-
tion of the death penalty also violated the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
150. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
151. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 1974) (emphasis added). See complete text of this
section infra note 175. In November 1972 California voters approved a constitutional amend-
ment overruling Anderson and reinstating the death penalty. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
153. During the period in which the California Constitution was being revised by the Cali-
fornia Constitution Revision Commission (CCRC), see infra notes 197-202, there was a strong
push by several members of the CCRC to bring all of the language of the California Declara-
tion of Rights into identical conformity with the Federal Bill of Rights. Telephone Interview
with Larry Sipes, former Staff Director of the California Constitution Revision Commission
(Nov. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Sipes Interview]. The debate on this suggestion ended up center-
ing on use of the language cruel or unusual punishment versus cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. Eventually, the Chairman of the CCRC Drafting Committee, Frank Newman, and the
Chief Staff Counsel, Larry Sipes, persuaded a majority of the CCRC's members to maintain
the alternate language. Id. Ironically, it is this distinction that the California Supreme Court
relied on in part to strike down the death penalty in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 639, 493
P.2d at 887, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 159. Thus, although the Anderson court ultimately concluded
that the death penalty was both cruel and unusual, based on the court's interpretation of the
California provision, a finding of either would have been sufficient to support the decision.
Rediscovering, supra note 147, at 481 n.4.
154. See Rediscovering, supra note 147, at 481-82; see also People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975):
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually identi-
cal to the [Federal] Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart.
The lesson of history is otherwise: the [Federal] Bill of Rights was based upon the
corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions rather than the reverse.
Id. at 550, 531 P.2d at 113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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Yet, even when no meaningful distinction can be made based on
textual differences in the state and federal provisions, California has not
hesitated to adopt independent interpretations of its constitutional provi-
sions.155 For example, although the state and federal constitutional
prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure are nearly identi-
cal, 56 in 1975 the California Supreme Court, in People v. Brisendine, 57
deviated from fourth amendment precedent1 5 8 and ruled that the Califor-
nia provision15 9 prevents police from conducting open-ended searches be-
yond the scope of their original search warrant.16 0
In addition, in the area of free speech, the California Supreme
155. See, e.g., Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 716, 470 P.2d 345, 350-51, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 366-67 (1970) (stricter state standard for double jeopardy affirmed despite extreme
similarity between state and federal constitutional provisions).
156. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tjhe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Article I, § 13 of the California
Constitution provides "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, may not be violated .... " (emphasis
added). The California Supreme Court did not base its decision in this instance on differences
in meaning between the phrases "shall not" and "may not." However, according to the mem-
bers of the CCRC who insisted on maintaining differences in the wording of state and federal
provisions, "may not" is broader than "shall not." Transcript of General Session of the Cali-
fornia Constitution Revision Commission, Oct. 8, 1970, at 42-46 [hereinafter Final Meeting
Transcript]. The Chairman of the CCRC, Bruce Sumner, and the Chairman of the CCRC
Drafting Committee, Frank Newman, believed that "may not" represented a direction to the
court not to do something; whereas "shall not" deprived the court of any power or jurisdiction
to even consider the question. Id. at 45-46.
157. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). In
Brisendine, a police officer inspected an opaque bottle and two envelopes that he came across
during a lawful weapons search. Id at 543, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court
held that, under the state constitution, "absent a showing of reasonable suspicion of the pres-
ence of an atypical weapon," lawful weapons searches by police could not be extended to cover
the examination of containers that could not possibly conceal an ordinary weapon. Id. at 547,
531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
158. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
159. .Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548-49, 531 P.2d at 1111-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28. In
basing its decision on the state constitution, the court reexamined the basic principles of feder-
alism and defiantly asserted that "[tihis court has always assumed the independent vitality of
our state Constitution .... In interpreting... [it], we of course retain the 'power to impose
higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution.'" Id. at
548-49, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
160. The California Supreme Court's holding in Brisendine and other criminal procedure
cases protecting rights based on the California Constitution may have been abrogated by the
passage of Proposition 8, "The Victims Bill of Rights," in June, 1982. Goldberg, supra note
146, at 404 n.65. But see People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d. 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1985). Proposition 8 was incorporated into the California Constitution as article I, § 28. De-
spite the passage of Proposition -8, the independent state grounds doctrine relied on in
Brisendine has survived. Goldberg, supra note 147, at 404 n.65; see, eg., Ramona R. v. Supe-
rior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985) (Proposition 8 does not
proscribe state constitution's protection against self-incrimination).
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Court, in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,161 interpreted the state
constitution as protecting the reasonable exercise of free speech rights in
privately owned shopping centers. This ruling also contradicted United
States Supreme Court decisions applying the First Amendment. I62 Nev-
ertheless, upon review, the United States Supreme Court strongly reaf-
firmed that the California Declaration of Rights, as construed by the
California Supreme Court, could provide "individual liberties more ex-
pansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."' I63
To further memorialize the views expressed in the above described
cases, the California Declaration of Rights was amended in 1974 to cod-
ify the common-law protection of independent state rights. The amend-
ment added a clause to article I, section 23 of the 1879 Constitution"6
specifying that rights guaranteed by the California Constitution are not
dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. I65
This provision was added by the state legislature during its review of
proposed revisions to the California Constitution 66 and was subse-
quently approved by California voters. 67 The inclusion of this provision
in the California Declaration of Rights reaffirms and solidifies the tradi-
tional view that "the California Constitution is, and always has been, a
document of independent force."' 68
IV. The California Excessive Fines Clause Should Apply to
Punitive Damage Awards In Civil Cases
It remains uncertain how the United States Supreme Court will de-
cide future due process and vagueness challenges to punitive damage
awards. In addition, even if the Court ultimately decides that punitive
161. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
162. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
163. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
164. Former § 23 provided, "[tlhis enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people." The CCRC recommended that this provision, which it
renumbered as § 25, should be retained without alteration. California Constitution Revision
Commission, Background Study 3, Oct. 1969, at 57.
165. As revised and renumbered by the legislature, article I, § 24 provides, "[r]ights guar-
anteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution. This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by
the people." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
166. After the CCRC completed its proposed revision of the state constitution in 1971, it
presented its recommendations to the legislature for review. See infra notes 224-225 and ac-
companying text.
167. J. GOULD, REPORT ON MATERIALS OF CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION RE-
LATING TO PROVISIONS IN CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION RECOMMENDED OR ENDORSED BY
COMMISSION, Dec. 1974, at 74-77.
168. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-13, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 328-29 (1975); cf. Massey, Antifederalism and The Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REV. 987 (1988).
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damages violate some constitutional theory, it is unclear what constitu-
tional limits the Court would impose. Fortunately, irrespective of how
these issues are decided, and in spite of the Court's decision in Browning-
Ferris interpreting the Eighth Amendment,169 as discussed above, 170
states have independent power to control punitive damages based on
state constitutional grounds. In fact, in Browning-Ferris the Supreme
Court specifically stated that "[a]lthough petitioners and their amici
would like us to craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that
relies on notions of proportionality between punitive and compensatory
damages, ... these are matters of state, and not federal, common law. '' 7 1
Similarly, a year before rendering its decision in Browning-Ferris, the
Supreme Court stated in Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw 172
that it might be more appropriate for states to "resolve the issue [of limits
on punitive damages] by relying on the state constitution or on some
other adequate and independent nonfederal ground." 173 To this end, sev-
eral state supreme courts have held that state constitutional excessive
fines clauses apply to civil cases, and to punitive damages in particular. 174
This Note strongly advocates the state constitutional approach and
argues that California should place limits on punitive damages pursuant
to the excessive fines clause of the California Constitution. 175 As noted
in Part 1,176 no California case has ever dealt with such an application of
the California excessive fines clause.177 However, the Clause has been
invoked to limit statutory civil penalties 178 and fines for civil con-
tempt.!79 In addition, the history of the California provision indicates
that its application was not intended to be limited to criminal cases. 1s0
Thus, in keeping with Justice Brandeis' belief that states should serve as
169. See supra notes 97-140 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
171. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2922 (emphasis
added).
172. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
173. Id. at 1651.
174. See infra notes 271-298 and accompanying text.
175. Article I, § 17 of the California Constitution, as amended in 1974, provides: "Cruel or
unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed." CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 17.
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
177. The California Court of Appeal in Downey did consider application of the Eighth
Amendment to punitive damages. Downey Say. & Loan Ass'n v._Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189
Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1100-01, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 851 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023
(1988); see also George v. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 213 Cal. App. 3d
729, 798, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 257 (1989).
178. See infra notes 254-262 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 182-230 and accompanying text.
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the laboratories of the nation, I81 California should experiment with state
constitutional limits on punitive damage awards.
A. Historical Development of the California Excessive Fines Clause
The first California Constitution, drafted in 1849, contained a Dec-
laration of Rights that consisted of provisions copied directly from sec-
tions in the New York and Iowa state constitutions. 182 Among the
provisions incorporated was a prohibition against excessive fines.183 This
provision was taken verbatim from the New York Constitution of
1846.184 The representatives to the 1849 constitutional convention
adopted this provision without debate. 85 As a result, their views on the
specific application of the provision cannot be ascertained directly.
However, since the precise language of the original California clause
was taken from the New York Constitution, the history of its adoption in
New York provides potential insight to the intent of the California fram-
ers.186 In addition, several representatives from the New York constitu-
tional convention of 1846 participated in the debates at the California
constitutional convention of 1849.187 Unfortunately, the framers of the
New York Constitution also did not engage in any debate over the adop-
181. There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experi-
mentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and eco-
nomic needs.... It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
182. J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1849, 31
(1850) [hereinafter 1849 DEBATES].
183. The provision, introduced as § 5, stated, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall wit-
nesses be unreasonably detained." Id. at 30.
184. Id. at 31.
185. The discussion in the report of the debates is terse: "The question being on the fifth
section of the report, Mr. McCarver moved to strike it out. He wanted no legislative enact-
ments in a bill of rights. The motion to strike out was decided in the negative, and the section
was adopted without debate." Id. at 41. Apparently, for expediency, most of the sections in
the Declaration of Rights were adopted with little or no debate. Rediscovering, supra note 147,
at 491; see also 1849 DEBATES, supra note 182, at 30-48, 288-94, 298.
186. During the debates at the California convention concerning provisions borrowed from
the New York Constitution, repeated references were made to New York's rationale in adopt-
ing the original measure. See 1849 DEBATES, supra note 182, at 39, 299 (the history of New
York furnishes precedent for the guidance of California). But see Rediscovering, supra note
147, at 490 ("there is no evidence that the framers relied on or were exposed to written histo-
ries of the proceedings of [the New York and Iowa] conventions.").
187. See 1849 DEBATES, supra note 182, at 39; see also Grodin, Some Reflections on State
Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 394 (1988) (citing a discussion during the de-
bates in which "Mr. Sherwood, from New York, rose in reply.")
tion of their state excessive fines provision.18 8 Consequently, this re-
source is of no help in deciphering the intent of the framers of the
original California Constitution.
Beginning in 1878, another constitutional convention was held in
California in order to correct several perceived "deficiencies of the old
constitution." 189 During this convention, the provisions in the Declara-
tion of Rights were once again not discussed at length. 190 However, the
section containing the excessive fines clause was renumbered and became
section 6.191 In addition, several clauses were added to the section. The
additions included a clause defining when bail was appropriate and a pro-
hibition against confining witnesses in any room where criminals are ac-
tually imprisoned.' 9 2 The language of the excessive fines clause itself,
however, was not revised.' 93 Consequently, there was once again no de-
bate during the convention that might have revealed the intent of the
framers with respect to the application of this clause.' 4
In the 111 years since the 1879 Constitution was ratified,1 95 the Cali-
fornia Constitution has been amended numerous times through ballot in-
itiatives. 19 6 Among these measures, in November 1962, California voters
passed Proposition 7, which authorized the legislature to submit propos-
als to the voters for either a partial or total revision of the California
Constitution. 9  The impetus for this initiative was the belief that "the
188. The relevant New York provision, as originally introduced, read as follows: "5. Exces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted." S. CROSWELL & R. SUTTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK
STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 153, 429 (1846). The only
debate over this provision was whether or not to add a clause prohibiting witnesses from being
unreasonably detained. Id at 815. This amendment was adopted. Id.
189. Rediscovering, supra note 147, at 492 (footnotes omitted).
190. Id. ("While the Declaration of Rights was changed in certain respects, it did not com-
mand the attention of most of the delegates.").
191. E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO,
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1878, 243-47, 250-251, 1172-73, 1425, 1491 (1880) [hereinafter
1879 DEBATES].
192. As amended, the provision containing the excessive fines clause read as follows:
SEC. 6 All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses
when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted.
Witnesses shall not be unreasonably detained, nor confined in any room where
criminals are actually imprisoned.
.1d. at 1491.
193. Id.
194. The only issue involving § 6 that was debated at length during the convention related
to various proposed amendments that would have prevented the prohibition of corporal pun-
ishment. Id. at 243-47. These amendments were all eventually defeated. Id. at 1172.
195. The California Constitution of 1879 was approved by the voters in May 1879. Redis-
covering, supra note 147, at 485 n.21.
196. Id. at 487.
197. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 1.
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California Constitution had grown 'to be bad in form, inconsistent in
many respects, filled with unnecessary detail, and replete with matter
which might more properly be contained in the statutory law of the
state.' "198 To remedy this situation, the state legislature passed a resolu-
tion empowering the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization
(which later became the Joint Rules Committee) to appoint members to a
constitutional revision commission.' 99 The California Constitution Revi-
sion Commission (CCRC) was subsequently formed and began meeting
in February 1964.2"
The CCRC divided its work into three phases.2"1 Phase III in-
cluded a complete revision of article I, the California Declaration of
Rights.2" 2 During this revision, former section 6 of the 1879 Constitu-
tion was divided into three separate provisions.20 3 The excessive fines
provision was renumbered as section 17 and combined with only one
other provision, the cruel or unusual punishment clause.2° The decision
to reshape former section 6 was based on research contained in a Back-
ground Study done on article I and recommendations in a report of the
Article I Committee.205
The purpose of the Background Study was to analyze the article
completely and present alternative methods of treating each provision.
206 Regretfully, the Background Study contains only a short, one para-
graph discussion of the excessive fines clause.20 v However, the Back-
ground Study does note that "[t]he prohibition against excessive fines has
been construed to prohibit imprisonment for an unlimited period for
nonpayment of a fine for civil contempt. ' 20  Despite the quasi-criminal
nature of civil contempt citations, this finding does lend some support to
the proposition that the California excessive fines clause traditionally has
been applied in at least nominally civil contexts. 209 Although the Back-
ground Study does not draw any conclusions about the application of the
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2-3.
203. Revised §§ 10, 12 and 17 were created from former § 6. Id. at 77, 81-82.
204. Id. at 81. As revised, section 17 provides simply that "[c]ruel or unusual punishment
may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed." Id.
205. Id. at 4-5.
206. Id. In describing the history of former § 6, the Background Study incorrectly states
that "the section was enacted in the Constitution of 1849 and has not been modified." CALI-
FORNIA CONSTITUTION REvISION COMMISSION, ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
BACKGROUND STUDY 4, Dec. 1969, at 5 [hereinafter BACKGROUND STUDY] (emphasis
added).
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. In support of this assertion, the Background Study cites Ex Parte Karlson, 160
Cal. 378, 117 P. 447 (1911). See discussion infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
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excessive fines clause, it is completely devoid of any indication that the
clause was intended to apply only in criminal cases.210
Upon its completion, the Background Study was reviewed by the
Article I Committee, which in turn debated each provision and made
substantive recommendations to the whole CCRC.211 Unfortunately, the
Article I Committee Report (Committee Report) also does not discuss
application of the excessive fines provision.2 12 In fact, with respect to the
excessive fines and bail provisions of former section 6, the Committee
Report states only that it "recommends that these provisions be retained
without substantive change." ' 3 According to the report, the main rea-
son for maintaining the provisions of former section 6 was to insure that,
as a minimum, the basic protections of the Eighth Amendment applied
to California citizens.21 4
The Committee Report covering former section 6 discusses other
sections as well and is subtitled "criminal procedure." ' 5 However, this
grouping was expressly created merely to facilitate convenient analysis
by the Article I Committee and was not intended to convey any broader
210. See BACKGROUND STUDY, supra note 206, at 5-8.
211. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 5. The language proposed by the Article I Committee
was as follows:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. Wit-
nesses shall not be unreasonably detained.... All persons may be released at the
discretion of the court on their own recognizance unless for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or the presumption great.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, MINUTES OF ARTICLE I COMMITTEE
MEETING, Dec. 12, 1969, at 1-2. At this same meeting, a motion was made to add the words
"or imprisonment" after the phrase "excessive fines." Id. at 2. This motion failed. Id.
212. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, ARTICLE I (DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS): REPORT IV-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROPOSED REVISION OF SECTIONS 5, 6, 13,
19 AND 20, Feb. 1970, at 3-5 [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
213. Id. at 4. According to Larry Sipes, former Staff Director of the CCRC, "in our re-
ports, where we were only making a change in organization or an attempt at improved style or
reduced length, we usually expressed the Commission's intention not to change the substance
of the provision, which had the effect of leaving any prior judicial precedent in tact." Sipes
Interview, supra note 153; see also CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, PRO-
POSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, PART 5 (Articles I, XX, and XXII),
Jan. 1971, at 19 [hereinafter REPORT To LEGISLATURE] (expressing same intention in com-
mentary following proposed revisions outlined in CCRC's report to California legislature).
214. The Committee Report states that:
[The Eighth] Amendment serves as a prohibition on federal action and originally did
not apply to the states. However, most of the Eighth Amendment has been judicially
declared to apply to the states via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The extent of this judicial incorporation is unclear and the law is presently in
a formative stage. This fact militates strongly in fayor of retaining the basic guaran-
tees in Section 6 as part of California law.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 212, at 5.
215. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 212, cover page. The other sections addressed in
the Committee Report are former § 5, 13, 19 and 20. Id.
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intention to limit the application of the excessive fines clause to criminal
cases.2 16  Such a limitation would be entirely inconsistent with the
CCRC's overall approach to its mission. To the contrary, with respect to
provisions in the Declaration of Rights, the CCRC made every effort to
"preserve options" rather than restrict application.2 17 Moreover, when
the CCRC did intend to limit the application of a specific provision, it
expressed its intention explicitly.21
After the whole CCRC conducted further study and debate on the
Article I Committee's recommendations, it approved the revised article
in substance and forwarded it to the Drafting Committee."I9 The Draft-
ing Committee was then responsible for rephrasing the article in more
modem, concise language and organizing it in a more logical frame-
work.22 In this regard, the Drafting Committee divided former section
6 into two separate sections.221 During this reorganization, however, the
Drafting Committee did not add any language to the excessive fines
clause specifying that its application was to be limited to criminal
cases.
222
After the Drafting Committee's formulation was approved by the
216. Sipes Interview, supra note 153; see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 212, at i
("For purposes of analysis this Article was divided by the Article I Committee into four topics-
Eminent Domain, Government and Policies, Civil Rights and Criminal Procedure.") (empha-
sis added).
217. "Especially in the Article I provisions, every effort was made to preserve options
rather than foreclose them." Sipes Interview, supra note 153.
218. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a
speedy public trial .... ") (emphasis added); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
219. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 5. The text of the Committee's proposal was as follows:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or the presumption great. All persons may be released at the discre-
tion of the court on their own recognizance .... Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. Wit-
nesses shall not be unreasonably detained.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, MINUTES OF COMMISSION MEETING,
Mar. 19, 1970, at 13. During this meeting, a proposal was again introduced to add the phrase
"and imprisonment" after the word "fines." Id. This motion was once again defeated. Id.
220. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 5.
221. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE DRAFTING
COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE I, SECTION 6, Nov. 1970 [hereinafter DRAFTING COMMITTEE RE-
PORT]. The text of the Drafting Committee's recommendation was as follows:
Sec. 6. A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital
crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail may not
be required. A person may be released on his own recognizance in the court's
discretion.
See. 7. Cruel and unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines
imposed.
Witnesses may not be unreasonably detained.
Id.
222. Id.
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entire CCRC,2 23 the complete package of proposed constitutional revi-
sions was forwarded to the Joint Rules Committee (JRC) of the Califor-
nia legislature.224 The JRC reviewed each of the CCRC's proposals and,
in some instances, made minor alterations.225 Significantly, the legisla-
ture did not add any explicit language restricting the application of the
excessive fines clause. 226 However, the legislature did add just this sort of
restrictive language to the new section prohibiting unreasonable deten-
tion.227 This provision had previously been part of former section 6.228
After the legislature completed its review of the CCRC's proposals,
the revised constitutional provisions were placed on the ballot for voter
approval.229 In November 1974 California voters passed Proposition 7,
which amended article I of the state constitution.230  Based on all avail-
able information, as well as the omission of any restrictive language in
revised article I, section 17, it is reasonable to conclude that neither the
CCRC nor the California Legislature intended to preclude application of
the excessive fines clause to civil cases.
223. The language agreed upon by the whole CCRC at its final meeting on October 8, 1970
was as follows:
Sec. 6. Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.
A person may be released on bail or on his own recognizance, in the court's
discretion. A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital
crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail may not
be required.
Witnesses may not be unreasonably detained.
Final Meeting Transcript, supra note 156, at 40-41. Although no changes to the Drafting
Committee's proposal were made at this meeting, for some unexplained reason, the language
contained in the DRAFTING COMMITTEE REPORT, dated November 1970, see supra note 221,
does not match the language agreed upon by the whole CCRC at this meeting.
224. 3. GOULD, supra note 167, at 2. The language of the proposed revision of former
section 6 contained in the CCRC's Report to the Legislature, matched the Drafting Commit-
tee's November 1970 Report, see supra note 223, rather than the language agreed upon by the
whole CCRC at its final meeting on October 8, 1970. REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note
213, at 19. Most notably, the language in the Drafting Committee Report prohibited "cruel
and unusual punishment" rather than "cruel or unusual punishment." DRAFTING COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 221. The text eventually adopted by the legislature corrected this
inconsistency. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 17, supra note 175; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 10
and 12 (amended 1974).
225. 3. GOULD, supra note 167, at 2-3.
226. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17, supra note 175.
227. As amended, Article I, § 10 provides that "[w]itnesses may not be unreasonably de-
tained. A person may not be imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, or in peacetime for a
militia fine." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
228. See supra note 192.
229. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 3. The voter information pamphlet does not mention
any specifies as to the intended application of the revised provisions of Article I. BALLOT
PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 5, 1974) at 24-27.
230. J. GOULD, supra note 167, at 3.
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1. State Action Requirement
Another unsettled issue regarding the scope of the California exces-
sive fines clause is whether its application is limited to cases involving
state action. As discussed above,2 31 the historical materials that trace the
development of the provision do not reveal the explicit intent of the fram-
ers' as regards application of the clause. On its face, the provision does
not contain any state action restriction.2 32 In contrast, other provisions
in the California Declaration of Rights expressly protect only against
state action. For example, the text of article I, section 25, the so-called
"Right to Fish," provides that "no law shall ever be passed making it a
crime for the people to enter upon the public lands within this State for
the purpose of fishing ... ."233 Since article IV, section 1 of the Califor-
nia Constitution vests the state legislature with exclusive legislative
power, the restriction contained in the "Right to Fish" provision can
only apply to action by the state.2 34
By the same token, some provisions in the California Constitution
are manifestly inapplicable to the state. The usury provisions set forth in
article XV, section 1 fit Within this category. These provisions mandate
the interest rates that lenders in California are permitted to charge.
Since all commercial lending in the state is done by private parties, arti-
cle XV, section 1 is, by virtue of its subject matter, exclusively applicable
to cases that do not involve state action.
Similarly, California courts have decided that some provisions in the
state Declaration of Rights do not require state action.235 For example,
in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,2 36 the California Supreme Court
held that the state constitution's free speech provision 211 prohibits pri-
vately owned shopping centers from restricting free speech activities.
California courts have also interpreted the right to privacy in the state
constitution238 as binding on private parties.239
231. See supra notes 182-230 and accompanying text.
232. See text of Article I, § 17, supra note 175.
233. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 25 (emphasis added).
234. See also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 4 ("The Legislature shall not pass any laws
permitting the leasing or alienation of any franchise.... ."); CAL. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1 ("The
legislature shall not, in any manner create any debt... which shall... exceed the sum of three
hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) ....").
235. Courts in other states have adopted the view that state constitutions only limit the
power of state governments. See, e.g., Western Pa. Socialist Workers 192 Campaign v. Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986).
236. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), aff'd. 447 U.S.
74 (1980); see also supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
237. Article I, § 2 of the California Constitution provides that "[e]very person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
this right."
238. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution provides, in part, that "[a]ll people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are... privacy."
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In other instances, the California Supreme Court has decided that
even when a particular provision of the state constitution requires state
action, the necessary level of state involvement may differ substantially
from that required under counterpart provisions in the Federal Constitu-
tion. For example, in Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co.,2  the court held that, despite the absence of any ex-
plicit restriction in the text of the state constitution's equal protection
clause,241 application of the provision was limited to state action.242 The
court nevertheless went on to hold that the requisite level of state action
was not the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment.243 In this re-
gard, the court stated that "'in interpreting the scope of the due process
clause under the state Constitution, we are not bound by federal deci-
sions analyzing the state action requirement under the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendments .... ."I Ultimately, the court in Gay Law
Students ruled that the California equal protection provision "bars a pub-
lic utility from engaging in arbitrary employment discrimination." 245
The California Supreme Court has never decided whether the state
excessive fines clause requires state action. Very recently, however, in
Molko v. Holy Spirit Association For The Unification of World Christian-
ity,246 the court stated that "judicial sanctioning of tort recovery consti-
tutes state action sufficient to invoke the same constitutional protections
applicable to statutes and other legislative actions . . . ." Thus, even if
the court subsequently determines that the excessive fines clause is sub-
239. See Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989);
Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976); Miller
v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1489-93, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682-85
(1986); cf White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106
(1975). The California Supreme Court has yet to directly confront this issue; however, dicta in
Schmidt v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 370, 389 n.13, 769 P.2d 932, 944 n.13, 256 Cal. Rptr.
750, 762 n.13 (1989), is consistent with the view that, at least in some circumstances, the state
privacy provision applies to purely private action.
240. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
241. Article I, § 7(a) of the California Constitution provides that "[a] person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of
the laws .... ." The court in Gay Law Students pointed out that the absence of any explicit
state action requirement in the California provision distinguished it from the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d at 468, 595 P.2d at 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The
court, however, chose not to rely on this distinction in order to find that the state provision did
not require state action. Id.
242. Id. (citing Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 366-67, 521 P.2d 441, 449-50,
113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 (1974)).
243. Id. at 469 (citing Kruger, I1 Cal. 3d at 367 n. 21 and Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. 3d 268, 282, 578 P.2d 925, 934, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 217 (1978)).
244. Id (quoting Garfinkle, 21 Cal. 3d at 282).
245. Id. at 467.
246. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1114, 762 P.2d 46, 57, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 133 (1988) (citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)) (holding that, despite state and federal
constitutional protections, religious groups are not immune from all tort liability).
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ject to a state action restriction, based on the language in Molko, and for
the reasons outlined earlier in connection with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Browning-Ferris,247 awards of punitive dam-
ages satisfy the requirement.
B. Prior Application of the California Excessive Fines Clause
As noted in the CCRC Background Study,248 despite the fact that
the limits of the California excessive fines clause have never been fully
defined, the clause has been held to limit penalties imposed for civil con-
tempt. In Ex parte Karlson,249 the petitioner, Louis Karlson, was fined
$200 for contempt of court after he violated an injunction.2 0 Karlson
failed to pay the fine and was taken into custody by the Los Angeles
county sheriff.25 1 Under the terms of Karlson's contempt citation, if he
did not pay the fine he was to be imprisoned in the county jail until the
fine was paid off "at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each two
dollars" of the fine. 2  Karlson applied for a writ of habeas corpus. In
denying the writ, the California Supreme Court stated in dicta that "[t]he
danger that persons may be imprisoned for an unlimited period for non-
payment of a fine for [civil] contempt is, as we think, completely removed
by the constitutional guaranty that, 'excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be
inflicted.' ,253 Thus, since at least 1911, the entire California provision,
including the excessive fines clause, has been interpreted as applying to
civil penalties.
In 1978 this historical application was confirmed and expanded to
cover other statutory civil penalties. In Hale v. Morgan 254 the plaintiff,
Hale, brought suit against his landlord, Morgan, for wrongfully shutting
off utility services to his mobile home for a total of 173 days.255 Califor-
nia Civil Code section 789.3 "assesses a penalty of $100 per day against a
landlord who wilfully deprives his tenant of utility services for the pur-
pose of evicting the tenant. '2 6 The trial court found in favor of Hale
and awarded him $17,300, or $100 times 173, the precise penalty called
for under the statute.257 Morgan appealed claiming that the penalty vio-
247. See supra notes 97-140 and accompanying text; cf Park Redlands Covenant Control
Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 98-99, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205-06 (1986) (state action is
present when a state court "lends the affirmative aid of the courts").
248. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
249. 160 Cal. 378, 383, 117 P. 447, 449 (1911).
250. Id. at 378-79.
251. rd.
252. Id. at 379.
253. Id. at 383.
254. 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978).
255. Id. at 393.
256. Id. at 392; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West 1982).
257. 22 Cal. 3d at 393.
lated state and federal due process provisions and that the penalty was
constitutionally excessive.25 The California Supreme Court 59 held that
the penalty was oppressive and unreasonable'o and as such violated due
process.261 The court also held that "under all of the circumstances of
this case, the amount of the penalties is constitutionally excessive. 2 6
2
In his concurring opinion in Hale, Justice Newman 263 stated that
"[a]rticle I, section 17 of the California Constitution commands that 'ex-
cessive fines' not be imposed. In my view those two words justify rever-
sal of the judgment here. There is ample reason for concluding that the
constitutional prohibition covers civil as well as criminal fines."' 6 Jus-
tice Newman did not cite any authority to support this conclusion;265
however, he had inside information. He was, coincidentally, both a
member of the CCRC and Chairman of the Drafting Committee that was
responsible for revising article I, section 17 of the California Constitu-
tion.266 According to Justice Newman, his experience as a member of
the CCRC is the source of his "ample reason" to believe that the Califor-
nia excessive fines clause applies to civil as well as criminal fines.2 67 In
258. Id. at 397-98.
259. Id. at 392. Justice Richardson announced the opinion of the court. Id. Justices To-
briner, 1glosk, Clark, Manuel, and Chief Justice Bird concurred in the judgment. Id. at 407.
Justice Newman wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id.
260. Id at 397-98. The court held that the fatal aspect of the statute was that it did not
give the trier of fact any discretion in fixing the penalty. Id. at 402 ("The exercise of reason is
replaced by an adding machine."). The court further reasoned that, "[in] our view ... section
789.3 in its unlimited, 'open ended' character compels penalties which, in particular circum-
stances, may clearly exceed any appropriate and proportionate sanction for wrongful utility
termination." Id at 403. However, the court did concede that "there are doubtless some
situations in which very large punitive assessments are both proportioned to the landlord's
misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes." Id. at 404.
261. Id. at 397-98. Unfortunately, in reaching its conclusion the court did not specify
whether it was relying on the state or federal constitutional provision. In such a case, pursuant
to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983), upon review by the United States
Supreme Court, it would be presumed that the decision was based on federal grounds. See also
Grodin, supra note 187, at 399.
262. 22 Cal. 3d at 407. Since the court did not specifically cite article I, § 17 as authority
for its conclusion, the holding in Hale is somewhat ambiguous. See supra note 261.
263. According to Justice Newman, he frequently used a standard one line concurring
opinion to the effect that he concurred in the result but he would have relied solely on state
rather than federal constitutional grounds. Telephone interview with Frank C. Newman, For-
mer Justice of the California Supreme Court (Oct. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Newman Interview];
see, e.g., Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 923, 654 P.2d 758, 769, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586
(1982); People v. Mirmirani, 30 Cal. 3d 375, 388, 636 P.2d 1130, 1138, 178 Cal. Rptr. 792, 800
(1981); Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 454, 613 P.2d 210, 227, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 166
(1980); People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal. 3d 577, 595, 601 P.2d 207, 218, 159 Cal. Rptr. 191,
202 (1979).
264. 22 Cal. 3d at 407 (Newman, J., concurring).
265. Id.
266. Newman Interview, supra note 263.
267. Id.
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any event, Hale clearly stands for the proposition that civil penalties can
be constitutionally excessive.
C. Application of Excessive Fines Clauses in Other State Constitutions
Unlike state court opinions, decisions by the United States Supreme
Court set a floor for the rest of the nation. 68 This fact may encourage
the Supreme Court to take a more conservative approach in interpretting
federal constitutional provisions.26 9 Since state courts are not subject to
this same institutional constraint, some commentators argue that instead
of relying on United States Supreme Court precedent it is more appropri-
ate for state courts to look to the decisions of other state courts for gui-
dance in interpretting similar state constitutional provisions.270 In
keeping with this view, courts in several other states have held that state
excessive fines clauses, identical to California's, apply to civil cases in
general and to punitive damages in particular. 71
In 1980 the Texas Supreme Court expressly ruled that the excessive
fines clause of the Texas Constitution2 72 was equally applicable to civil
and criminal cases. In Pennington v. Singleton2 73 the plaintiff, Pen-
nington, purchased a used boat, motor and trailer from the defendant,
Singleton, a nonmerchant seller.2 74 Pennington subsequently brought
suit against Singleton under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
268. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
269. Grodin, supra note 187, 402 (citing Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activ-
ism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 731, 734-53 (1982)).
270. Id.
271. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, appeal dismissed, 109 S.
Ct. 36 (1988); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). Similarly, while expressly
ruling that its state excessive fines provision does not apply to civil cases, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held "the principle embodied in the [state] constitutional provision is, of
course, applicable in all proceedings, civil as well as criminal .... Scranton City v. Peoples
Coal Co., 274 Pa. 63, 71, 117 A. 673, 676 (1922); see also Geffen v. Baltimore Mkt., 325 Pa.
509, 191 A. 24 (1937). Apparently, despite acknowledging that civil penalties may be exces-
sive, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been unwilling to establish constitutional standards
of excessiveness.
Courts in other states have more explicitly held that state excessive fines clauses apply
only to criminal cases. Lazarus Dep't Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 529 (Ind. 1989);
Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 755 (N.D. 1989); Coty v. Ramsey Assoc., 546 A.
2d 196, 207 (Vt. 1988); Palmer v. A. H. Robins, 684 P.2d 187, 216 (Colo. 1984); Village of
Sister Bay v. Hockers, 106 Wis. 2d 474, 481, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (1982). These opinions all
rely on one or both of the United States Supreme Court's controversial decisions in Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. and Ingraham v. White as authority for their holdings.
Browning-Ferris and Ingraham are discussed and criticised supra notes 77-140 and accompany-
ing text.
272. Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution provides in part that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted."
273. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
274. Id. at 685.
[Vol. 17:439
EXCESSIVE FINES
sumer Protection Act (DTPA) when he found defects in the motor.2 75
The trial court found in favor of Pennington and awarded him treble
damages, as provided under the DTPA.276 On appeal,277 Singleton chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the treble damages provision as "an exces-
sive fine in violation of both due process limitations and Article I, section
13 of the Texas Constitution," the state excessive fines provision.278 The
Texas Supreme Court accepted the premise of Singleton's argument and
announced that "'[ffines' as used in article I, section 13 includes civil
penalties., 279
As authority for its decision in Pennington, the Texas Supreme
Court cited State v. Galveston H. & S.A. Ry..28 In Galveston four rail-
road companies were fined for failing to pay an annual tax of one percent
on their gross receipts.281 The statute establishing the tax imposed a pen-
alty of $200 per day for late payment.282 The defendants challenged the
fine as excessive under the state constitution.283 The Texas Supreme
Court held that "[t]he term 'fines' is synonymous with.., penalties, and
the section of the [Texas] Constitution [prohibiting excessive fines] ap-
plies to penalties prescribed by this act for the failure of the parties to pay
the taxes." 284
More recently, a Texas appeals court, in Victoria Bank & Trust Co.
v. Brady,28 squarely addressed the applicability of the Texas excessive
fines clause to punitive damage awards. The court initially attempted to
distinguish Pennington because it involved a statutory treble damage
275. Id. Prior to the sale, Singleton represented to Pennington that the items had been
recently "worked on," were in "perfect condition," and were "just like new." Id. As it turned
out, the motor's housing was cracked and had been previously repaired inadequately. Id.
276. Id. Based on Pennington's actual damages of $481.68, the trial court awarded him
$1445.04. Id. Prior to trial, however, the parties agreed to a $500 limit on exemplary dam-
ages, if such were awarded. Id. Due to this agreement, the award was reduced to $981.68. Id.
Despite this reduction, for purposes of appeal, the court held that "the case must be treated as
one in which treble damages were recovered." Id. at 688. The court reasoned that "[t]he $500
awarded in addition to Pennington's actual damages were not awarded as exemplary damages,
but rather as a recovery of statutory treble damages partially waived by stipulation." Id.
277. Id. At the first level of appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment. Id. The court, however, granted Singleton's petition for rehearing and subse-
quently reversed the judgment of the trial court and awarded Pennington nothing. Id. at 686.
The Texas Supreme Court granted Pennington's application for a writ of error. Id.
278. Id. at 690.
279. Id. The Pennington court ultimately ruled that the treble damages liability imposed
by the DTPA was not constitutionally excessive. Id. at 690-91.
280. 100 Tex. 153, 97 S.W. 71 (1906), rev'd on other grounds, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
281. Id. at 73.
282. Id. at 73, 78.
283. .1d. at 78.
284. Id. The court went on to rule that the fines imposed by the tax statute were in fact
constitutionally excessive. Id. at 78-79.
285. 779 S.W.2d 893, 912-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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award instead of a punitive damage award imposed by a jury.2 86 Never-
theless, the court ultimately ruled that "whether punitive damages are
[constitutionally] excessive is a question to be decided under the facts of
each individual case. On the facts now before us, we necessarily reach
the conclusion that the exemplary damages awarded below [were] not
excessive under Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution., 287 The Victo-
ria Bank cdse thus implicitly confirms that the Texas Constitution's pro-
hibition against excessive fines applies to civil penalties and places limits
on punitive damage awards.
In 1988 the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a similar interpretation
of the Georgia Constitution's excessive fines clause. In Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. Brown288 Wright Contracting Company was hired to do grading
work on a certain plot of land.289 Wright sued for damages when one of
its bulldozers was destroyed upon striking and rupturing an unmarked,
underground pipeline maintained by Colonial Pipeline.29 ° A jury
awarded Wright $52,728 in actual damages, $304 in consequential dam-
ages, and $5,000,000 in punitive damages, over 100 times the actual
damages.29'
On appeal, Colonial argued that the punitive damage award violated
due process and was an excessive fine prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment.292 It is unclear from the opinion whether Colonial raised the state
excessive fines clause in its appeal. Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme
Court "elected" to decide the case based on the excessive fines clause of
the Georgia Constitution.293 In doing so the court concluded unequivo-
cally that "the excessive fines clause of . . .the Georgia Constitution
applies to the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases .... 294 In
reaching this conclusion, the court cited Justice White's dissent in Ingra-
ham v. Wright with approval and noted that "[p]unitive damages,
although civil in nature, nonetheless serve the criminal law goal of deter-
rence rather than the traditional compensatory goal of civil law."' 295 The
286. Id. at 912.
287. Id. at 912-13.
288. 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827 (1988). The opinion consolidates appeals in two related
cases, Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown (Case No. 44925) and Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Wright
Contracting Co. (Case No. 44926). The discussion in the text relates solely to the second case.
289. Id. at 827-28.
290. Id. at 828-29.
291. Id. at 829.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 829 n.2, 831. Article I, § 1, para. 17 of the Georgia Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted; nor shall any person be abused in being arrested, while under arrest, or
in prison."
294. Colonial Pipeline, 365 S.E.2d at 831. Since the court decided the case based on the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Georgia Constitution, it did not address Colonial's due process
argument. Id. at 829 n.2.
295. Id. at 830.
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court further stated that it believed the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause "was intended as a protection from all excessive monetary
penalties." '296
The Colonial Pipeline case was a plurality opinion and as such it
may be of dubious precedential value.29 7 However, the United States
Supreme Court subsequently dismissed an appeal of the Georgia decision
for lack of jurisdiction.29 Thus, above all else, Colonial Pipeline affirms
and reinforces the principle that in interpreting state constitutional provi-
sions, state courts are not constrained by United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting similarly worded sections of the United States
Constitution.
V. Defining Excessiveness
Assuming that the California Supreme Court agrees that the exces-
sive fines clause of the California Constitution applies to punitive damage
awards in civil cases, the question remains what level of punitive dam-
ages should be deemed constitutionally excessive.
A. The Current System
Under the current system in California, in order to be sustained on
appeal, a punitive damage award need only bear a "reasonable relation-
ship" to the actual damages.2 99 Theoretically, the purpose of this re-
quirement is to provide an objective measure of harm to counterbalance
the inevitably subjective assessment of the reprehensibility of the defend-
ant's conduct.3 "o Since juries, however, are given no guidelines to assist
296. Id. at 831. A state court's interpretation of federal constitutional provisions is, of
course, not binding on the United States Supreme Court. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1041 (1983). The Georgia Court felt, however, that since the "Georgia Constitution was
patterned after the United States Constitution," its Eighth Amendment analysis was a condi-
tion precedent to its ultimate ruling with respect to the Georgia excessive fines clause. Colonial
Pipeline, 365 S.E.2d at 830 n.3.
297. Id. at 833.
298. Appeal dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 36 (1988).
299. See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237,
243 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, interpreting
California law, has repeatedly held that "[ain award of punitive damages is not considered
excessive as long as it punishes the wrongdoer without causing financial ruin." Transgo v.
Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985); El Ranco v. First Nat'l
Bank of Nevada, 406 F.2d 1205, 1219 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 875 (1969). Given
this highly deferential standard of review, punitive damage awards are understandably rarely
overturned in this jurisdiction.
300. Neal v. Fanner's Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 929, 582 P.2d 980, 991, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389, 399 (1978).
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in conducting this comparison, 3 1 "there is wide variance in the magni-
tude of assessments, with no apparent correlation between the amounts
assessed and defendants' desert., 312 In addition, a climate in which stan-
dards of liability are completely uncertain predominates.30 3
Some commentators have argued that the lack of sufficient guide-
lines provided juries and the unpredictability of punitive sanctions may
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30° In ad-
dressing this argument, Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opin-
ion in Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw3 05 that "[i]n my view,
because of the punitive character of [exemplary damage] awards, there is
reason to think that [they] may violate the Due Process Clause., 306 Ap-
plying the specific facts of Bankers Life, O'Connor then observed that
"[n]othing in Mississippi law warned appellant that by committing a tort
that caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could expect to incur a $1.6
million punitive damage award."3" 7 In addition, O'Connor further noted
that giving juries "wholly standardless discretion to determine the sever-
ity of punishment appears inconsistent with due process. '308 Based on
these concerns, O'Connor concluded that "the Court should scrutinize
carefully the procedures under which punitive damages are awarded in
civil lawsuits. '319
In addition to due process concerns, some commentators have also
pointed out that since most states, including California, allow juries to
301. Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (presently, there is no fixed
ratio for determining the proper proportion between actual and punitive damages in regard to
the "reasonable relationship" test).
302. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1,
62 (1982).
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 11, at 140, 151-58; Freeman, supra note 94, at 33. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST., amend.
XIV, § 1.
305. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joined in O'Connor's
concurring opinion. Id.
306. Id. at 1655. In her concurring and dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris, Justice
O'Connor reitterated her view of the due process issue: "I adhere to my comments in Bankers
Life .. . regarding the vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by juries
given unbridled discretion to impose punitive damages." Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2090, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
307. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1656.
308. Id. In Browning-Ferris Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion that
"[w]ithout statutory (or at least common law) standards for the determination of how large an
award of punitive damages is appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in
making this important, and potentially devastating, decision." 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Brennan also stated that punitive damages may raise due process concerns be-
cause they are "imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do what they
think is best." Id.
309. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1655.
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consider the wealth of the defendant in deciding the appropriate amount
of punitive damages,310 there is a serious risk that passion or prejudice
may influence the amount of punitive damages assessed by juries.311
While it may be true that "a penalty which would be sufficient to reform
a poor man is likely to make little impression on a rich one,"3 2 this
approach ignores the overriding goal of achieving proportionality of pun-
ishments to offenses.31 3 In addition, it is inevitable that "using wealth as
a factor in determining the size of punitive damage assessment[s] ...
invites otherwise unguided juries to indulge any redistributive inclina-
tions they may have .... ,,314 The result is a sort of "Robin Hood syn-
drome," whereby disproportionately large awards may be levied against
giant corporations or very wealthy individuals.31
B. Proposed Solution
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the present system for
meting out punitive damage awards presents a wide range of complex
problems. Most of these problems can be avoided through.the establish-
ment of a constitutional standard of excessiveness. To this end, this Note
advocates the adoption of a flexible formula, based on the treble damages
model, linking punitive damages to actual damages.316
The treble damages model is attractive for several reasons. First,
treble damages have a long history of use in both American and English
jurisprudence.31 7 In the United States, federal and state law are replete
with treble damages provisions, most notably in the area of antitrust
law.313 Further, states like Florida have already passed legislation plac-
ing a treble damage limit on punitive damage awards.31 9 In light of these
310. In California, the three factors used by juries to determine the appropriate amount of
punitive damages are: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the wealth of the
defendant; and (3) the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978).
311. See, eg., Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1457. In recognition of this possibil-
ity, punitive damage awards may be set aside in all jurisdictions if it is demonstrated that the
result was influenced by jury "passion" or "prejudice." See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 160-61 (1967) (plurality opinion).
312. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1191 (1931).
313. Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1457; see also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at
2933-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting); Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 94, at 13;
Frey, Do Punitives Fit the Crime, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 13, col. 1, and at 14, col. 1.
314. Ellis, supra note 302, at 61-62.
315. Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1460-61.
316. For purposes of this discussion, the phrases "actual damages" and "compensatory
damages" are used interchangeably. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979).
317. Massey, supra note 82, at 1265.
318. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C § 15; Clayton Antitrust Act, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 1987). "
319. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (West Supp. 1989); see also supra note 39 and ac-
companying text.
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developments, the adoption of a treble damage ceiling on punitive dam-
ages would not be without precedent.
Second, there is decisional authority suggesting that a treble damage
limit on punitive damages may be appropriate. For example, in Stokes v.
Delcambre32 the Fifth Circuit decided to uphold a punitive damage
award in part because it was "within the range of familiar treble damage
schemes."32 On several occasions, California courts have also struck
down punitive awards amounting to five times the actual damages. For
example, in Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda 322 a California court of appeal
concluded that a ratio of five times the compensatory damages on its face
"is some indication that the award resulted from passion and preju-
dice."323  Based on this analysis, the court reversed the punitive
award.324 Another California court of appeal reached the same result in
Allard v. Church of Scientology.325 These cases suggest that while puni-
tive awards of more than four times the actual damages may raise an
inference of excessiveness, awards of up to three times the actual dam-
ages may be presumptively constitutional.326
Consistent with this view, in 1986 the Special Committee on Puni-
tive Damages of the American Bar Association's Litigation Section
(A.B.A. Committee) recommended the adoption of just such a presump-
tion.327 However, according to the A.B.A. Committee's proposal328 the
320. 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983).
321. Id. at 1127. Despite this statement, the court voiced disapproval of jurisdictions that
use a formula to determine whether punitive damage awards are excessive. Id. In George v.
International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 213 Cal. App. 3d 729, 798 n.52, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 257 n.52 (1989) (citing Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal.
App. 3d 381, 388, 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 209 (1984)), a California court of appeal expressed
similar reservations about applying mathematical formulas: "While we recognize that standar-
dless discretion in the award of punitive damages may implicate constitutional concerns,...
rigid adherence to mathematical standards may be neither possible nor desireable ... 
322. 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 238 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1987).
323. 193 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 369. See Analytical Framework, supra note
81, at 1437 n.26 (listing cases in which courts found that the amount of punitive damages
warranted a presumption that the award resulted from passion or prejudice).
324. 193 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 369. But see George v. International Soc'y
For Krishna Consciousness, 213 Cal. App. 3d 729, 797, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 257 (1989) ("A
punitive/compensatory ratio of 6:1 is not particularly shocking.").
325. 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 453, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, 805 (1976) (punitive award of $250,000
deemed excessive where actual damages were only $50,000).
326. Massey, supra note 82, at 1273 (Punitive "award[s] of two to three times actual dam-
ages might be thought presumptively within the constitutional limits, inasmuch as the practice
of double or treble damages has a [long] historical pedigree."); see also Fanning, Damage Con-
trol, FORBES, June 29, 1987, at 84.
327. Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination 1986 A.B.A. LITIGATION SEC., SPE-
CIAL COMMITTEE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 65 [hereinafter A.B.A. COMMITTEE REPORT]
("Our specific proposal is that a ratio be adopted of ... three times the compensatory ver-
dict .... [I]f the verdict falls within that limit (is three times or less the compensatory [dam-
ages]), then there would be a presumption that it was not excessive."); see Mayne, Punitive
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presumption would not be absolute. Thus, plaintiffs could overcome the
treble damage limit based upon proof of "special circumstances" '329 war-
ranting a larger punitive award.330 For example, cases involving nominal
damages would qualify as an exception.33'
Conversely, defendants could also rebut the presumptive constitu-
tionality of awards within the treble damage limit by demonstrating that
the award was nevertheless disproportionate to the offense.332 Thus, in a
situation like the highly publicized Texaco v. Pennzoi1333 case, even
though the punitive damages were less than half of the actual dam-
ages, 334 the defendant could have moved to reduce the punitive award.
While the A.B.A. Committee's overall approach is good, certain
weaknesses in the proposal need to be addressed. First, several contin-
gencies should be added to the list of special circumstances allowing ab-
rogation of the ordinary treble damage limit. For example, if the
defendant's wrongful conduct was extremely profitable or caused serious
bodily injury, a larger punitive award might be justifiable. Larger puni-
tives might also be appropriate where the defendant engaged in a contin-
uing pattern of similar wrongful conduct. However, in order for the
system to retain its utility, the designated special circumstances would
Damages Committee Completes Work, Recommends Caps on Punitive Awards, LITIGATION
NEws, Winter 1987, at 3.
328. The proposal was based on a statistical review of jury verdicts. A.B.A. COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 327, at 1-3. For some unexplained reason, the Committee's proposal was
not included in the joint resolution adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1987.
Corcoran, Section Plays Key Role in Tort Reform Debate, LrrIGATION NEWS, Spring 1987, at
1, 8.
329. The report suggests three possible special circumstances: (1) total want of due care by
the defendant; (2) willful conduct by the defendant; and (3) persistent conduct by the defend-
ant after clear notice. A.B.A. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 327, at 65. Regrettably, this
facet of the proposal is given only cursory treatment in the report.
330. Id. at 65-66; Mayne, supra note 327, at 10. Professor Massey also would allow larger
awards in certain rigidly defined, egregious circumstances: "The historical practices surround-
ing amercement suggest that larger disparities might be justified in particularly heinous cir-
cumstances, [however,] it would be essential to define, with some particularity, the triggers for
such disproportionately large awards." Massey, supra note 82, at 1273.
331. The A.B.A. Committee Report notes that application of the treble damage limit to
nominal damage cases "would probably be regarded as undesirable." A.B.A. COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 327, at 69 n.30; see also Analytical Framework, supra note 81, at 1465
n.193.
332. The standard for review would be similar to that of an ordinary motion for remittitur.
333. 729 S.W.2d 768 (rex. Ct. App. 1987).
334. The actual damages were $7.53 billion and the punitive damage award was $3 billion.
Id. at 784. On appeal, a result similar to the suggestion presented in this Note was actually
achieved. Although it concluded that "[tihe proportion of punitive damages to actual damages
present[ed] no problem," the Texas Court of Appeals nevertheless reduced the punitive award
to $1 billion on the theory that "punitive damages of one billion dollars are sufficient to satisfy
any reason for their being awarded, whether it be punishment, deterrence, or encouragement
of the victim to bring legal action." Id at 865-66.
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have to be narrowly circumscribed and clearly defined.335
The second weakness of the A.B.A. Committee's proposal is that it
does not provide any guidance to juries in selecting between the three
levels of punishment available within the treble damages model. In the
absence of such guidelines, the same standardless decision-making that
currently prevails would continue, albeit within a confined sphere. By
the same token, mechanically multiplying the actual damages by three
would deprive the jury of any discretion in determining the amount of
punitive damages and would effectively take the decision out of the jury's
hands.
336
To prevent these problems, criteria for imposing intermediate levels
of punishment within the treble damages framework must be established.
Harold N. Hill, an Atlanta defense attorney,3 37 has proposed that the
trier of fact should either multiply the actual damages by one, if it is
determined that the defendant's conduct was intentional,338 or multiply
the actual damages by two, if it is shown that both the defendant's con-
duct and the harm caused were intentional.339 Based on these criteria,
once it is determined that punitive damages are appropriate under the
applicable state statute, the trier of fact would undertake a secondary
inquiry to determine whether an award of one or two times the actual
damages was appropriate. 31 While other formulations are undoubtedly
335. To avoid the necessity of creating a finite list of exceptions, the Florida punitive dam-
ages statute, which imposes a presumptive treble damage limit much like the A.B.A. Commit-
tee proposal, see supra notes 39 and 319, provides that the limit can be overcome if "the
claimant demonstrates... by clear and convincing evidence that the award is not excessive in
light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.73(1)(b) (West Supp. 1989). The implicit uncertainty in this scheme, however,
could continue to raise due process concerns. See discussion supra notes 304-309 and accom-
panying text.
336. This deprivation may also violate the state and federal constitutional rights of litigants
to a jury trial.
337. Mr. Hill represented the Colonial Pipeline Company in Colonial Pipeline v. Brown,
discussed supra notes 288-298. In deciding that case, the Georgia Supreme Court did not
adopt Mr. Hill's proposed formula or any other guidelines for setting punitive awards. Colo-
nial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1988). Instead, the lead opinion
by the Georgia court merely announced, in a conclusory fashion, that a punitive award of
approximately 100 times the compensatory damages was excessive. Id.
338. For purposes of this determination, the Restatement of Torts definition of intent (i.e.,
knowledge or substantial certainty) would apply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965).
339. Telephone interview with Harold N. Hill, Attorney at Law (Nov. 10, 1988).
340. By way of example, in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827
(1988), discussed supra notes 288-298 and accompanying text, if the jury had found that the
defendant's action was intentional but the harm caused was unintended, the appropriate puni-
tive damage award under Mr. Hill's guidelines would have been one times the actual damage
award of $52,728. Hence, the plaintiff's total award would have been $105,556, twice the
actual damages. Likewise, if the jury had concluded that the defendant intended to cause the
specific harm that resulted, the punitive damage award called for under the guidelines would
possible, these criteria are straightforward and could be applied by juries
with little difficulty.
The adoption of a comprehensive treble damages formula, along the
lines discussed above, would establish a clear constitutional standard of
excessiveness while at the same time providing both intermediate and
extraordinary levels of punishment based on the character of the defend-
ant's conduct. This approach would also comply with due process provi-
sions and reduce the risk of awards based on passion and prejudice.
VI. Conclusion
The emerging crisis created by the sharp increase in massive puni-
tive damage awards over the past several years demands a solution. In
response, some have suggested new statutory controls on the availability
and amount of punitive damages. Others, in desperation, have proposed
a complete overhaul of the tort system.34' Yet, a simpler answer may lie
in the state constitutional protection against the imposition of excessive
fines. The United States Supreme Court has decided that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to punitive damages awarded in civil cases
between private parties. Eventually, the Court may invalidate punitive
damage awards on due process or vagueness grounds. Yet, states need
not stand idly by awaiting that fateful day.342
It is unquestioned that states have the power to interpret state con-
stitutional provisions differently than their counterparts in the Federal
Constitution. California has always been a leader in asserting independ-
ent state rights and the time has come for it to take the initiative in set-
ting constitutional limits on punitive damages.343 Nothing in the history
of the California excessive fines clause precludes such an application. In
fact, the few California Supreme Court decisions interpreting the provi-
sion suggest that such a step is entirely appropriate.
have been $105,556. Under this scenario, the plaintiff would have received a total award of
$158,284-triple the actual damages incurred.
341. See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. RaV. 555 (1985).
342. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970), the Alaska Supreme Court
voiced precisely this sentiment. The court stated: "We need not stand by idly and passively,
waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be
moving concurrently to develop and expound the principles embedded in our constitutional
law." Id. at 402.
343. Reliance on the independent state grounds doctrine often is perceived as merely a
vehicle for activist judges to further liberal causes. See Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan
and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 429, 432-33 (1988).
Ironically, implementation of the approach suggested in this Note may represent a rare in-
stance in which independent state grounds are being used to promote what some see as con-
servative ends. Cf id. at 433. The aim of this Note, however, is neither to advance nor oppose
any particular political philosophy. Rather, the goal is simply to suggest a method of address-
ing a developing legal issue through application of existing legal principles.
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Once the threshold question whether the California excessive fines
clause applies to punitive damages is answered in the affirmative, Califor-
nia courts must then establish a principled method for determining ex-
cessiveness. A flexible system based on the treble damage model would
accomplish the purposes underlying punitive damages and at the same
time bring desperately needed order to the process. Moreover, this type
of system would also remedy other constitutional infirmities inherent in
the existing method of setting punitive damages. While the solution this
Note proposes is admittedly not a panacea for all of the potential
problems associated with punitive damages, it is a viable alternative to
the present state of affairs and should be given thoughtful consideration.
By Thomas Preston Klein*
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